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ABSTRACT
Previous research has established that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often
have impairments in both cognitive empathy and executive functioning (EF), although little attention has
been devoted to the relationships among these domains and ASD traits. Furthermore, the presence of
an emotional empathy deficit in individuals with ASD has only begun to be explored, and studies have
yielded discrepant findings likely attributable to differences in methodology and limited consideration of
positive versus negative content. There is some evidence to suggest that EF may be important for emotional empathy and ASD traits. The current study aimed to clarify the relationships among these variables by examining the possibility that EF mediates the relationship between empathy and ASD traits in
neurotypical adults. Although hypotheses regarding mediation were not supported, the study revealed a
novel finding that positive emotional empathy was negatively associated with ASD traits, whereas cognitive empathy was not associated with ASD traits. Furthermore, planning ability was positively associated
with cognitive empathy. Implications for future research based on these findings are discussed.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Limited empathy, or the ability to understand and share others’ feelings (Decety & Jackson,
2004), is often thought to be a core contributor to symptoms in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; de Waal, 2008; Decety & Meyer, 2008). Indeed, some studies have found impairments in cognitive empathy (eg., Dziobek et al., 2008; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007), or the ability to
take others’ perspectives and infer their thoughts and feelings, and emotional empathy (e.g., Bacon,
Fein, Morris, Waterhouse, & Allen, 1998), or the ability to feel other’s emotions, in individuals with ASD.
However, executive functions (EF), or a set of cognitive abilities that guide goal-oriented behaviors, have
been shown to be related to both ASD traits (e.g., Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005) and empathic abilities (e.g., Iacono, Ellenbogen, Wilson, Desormeau, & Nijjar,
2015; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010) in individuals with ASD. For example, reduced inhibitory control may
impair one’s ability to inhibit one’s own feeling, and impaired cognitive control may limit the ability to
switch between one’s own emotion and the feeling of another person. Therefore, it is possible that EF
explains the relationship between empathy and ASD traits, and that previous studies that have not considered the role of EF in this relationship have neglected an important pathway through which these
abilities interact.
Findings regarding the relationships between ASD traits and cognitive and emotional empathy
are reviewed below, to elucidate the inconsistencies in findings across studies and to suggest that both
differences across study methods and lack of consideration of EF may play a role in explaining these inconsistencies. Particular attention is paid to literature regarding emotional empathy for positive and for
negative emotions, as a lack of consideration of valence may also account for variability in findings. Associations between EF and empathy, and between EF and ASD traits, are also reviewed to establish that
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these relationships have been found and to support the assertion that EF may explain the relationships
between empathy and ASD traits.
The current study builds on previous research by investigating emotional empathy using a reliable and naturalistic video task that successfully elicits positive empathy. The study also goes beyond prior research of individual relationships by investigating EF as a mediator of the relationships between
cognitive empathy and ASD traits and between emotional empathy and ASD traits in neurotypical (NT)
adults. It further seeks to answer the question regarding how positive empathy specifically relates to
these abilities, as this has not been explored in previous literature. See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the proposed overall model. Findings contribute to a better understanding of the relationships
among empathic abilities, EF, and ASD traits in neuroptypical (NT) adults.
1.1

Autism Spectrum Disorder
ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in social interaction and

communication skills, as well as the presence of restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped interests and
behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Previous diagnostic criteria from the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Test Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) defined several subtypes within the ASD category. They include Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder- Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS; thought
to be a milder ASD). Although new diagnostic conventions do not distinguish among these subtypes, as
the DSM-5 has eliminated them in favor of an overall “ASD” diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association,
2013), participants in the reviewed studies typically have one of these subtype diagnoses. Nevertheless,
research evidence supports the idea that traits associated with ASD lie on a continuum and are present
in the general population to varying degrees (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001; Constantino, 2011). Therefore, studying ASD traits in NT individuals can help to provide insight
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into the relationships between ASD traits and other constructs (Gökçen et al., 2016; Gökçen, Petrides,
Hudry, Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014).
1.2

Empathy
The term empathy generally refers to the ability to understand and share others’ feelings (De-

cety & Jackson, 2004). It is a skill that allows individuals to understand others’ intentions, share their
emotions, and better predict their behavior (Simon Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). As such, empathy is important to social learning and decision-making, and thus to having effective social interactions
and relationships (Krahn & Fenton, 2009).
Empathy comprises two main components, emotional (or affective) empathy and cognitive empathy. “Emotional empathy” refers to the ability to experience the emotions of other people, and starts
to develop as early as infancy (Hillis, 2014; Krahn & Fenton, 2009; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & ZahnWaxler, 2011). Two related processes that are often used to measure emotional empathy include emotional contagion, or adoption of another person’s affective state (Hillis, 2014), and empathic concern,
which incorporates sympathy and is associated with prosocial behaviors (Decety & Jackson, 2004).
“Cognitive empathy” refers to the ability to recognize others’ perspectives and make inferences about
what someone thinks or feels, or to identify their point of view (Hillis, 2014; Krahn & Fenton, 2009;
Shamay-Tsoory, 2016). This concept is often referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing (Fan,
Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2014), and is a skill that comes about later in development. In particular,
research suggests that ToM emerges in stages throughout early development and is fairly developed by
the age of 5 years in NT children (Wellman & Liu, 2004).
Empathic skills are important for success in social situations, as an understanding of others’
emotions is necessary to guide appropriate social responses (Decety & Lamm, 2006; Gable, Gonzaga, &
Strachman, 2006; Morelli, Lieberman, & Zaki, 2015). Because empathy supports effective social interactions and the development and maintenance of relationships (Decety & Lamm, 2006; Morelli et al.,
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2015), it is likely that impaired empathy is associated with relationship difficulties. For example, an individual with impaired emotional empathy may not respond to another’s distress with concern and helping behaviors, leaving the distressed individual feeling as though the other does not care about him and
thus damaging their relationship. Impaired cognitive empathy may lead to similarly inappropriate behavior, due to the lack of understanding of the other’s perspective (Kerem, Fishman, & Josselson, 2001).
Individuals with ASD have impaired social interactions and atypical peer relationships (APA,
2013); as such, impaired empathy may be associated with these deficits. Therefore, findings regarding
emotional and cognitive empathic deficits in individuals with ASD and in relation to ASD traits are reviewed below. The relationships of these domains with EF are also considered to establish support for
investigation of EF as a mediator of these relationships. The review focuses on findings in adults, but
when limited is supplemented with findings in children.
1.3

Empathy and ASD
Due to the importance of intact empathic understanding to effective social interactions and re-

lationship development as discussed above, empathic impairment is a candidate contributor to the social deficits observed in individuals with ASD. Some evidence has been provided for a general empathy
impairment in individuals with ASD. For example, some have found that on the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), a self-report measure of both cognitive and emotional empathy, adults
with ASD reported impaired empathy (Spek, Scholte, & Berckelaer-Onnes, 2010). However, findings are
less consistent when considering cognitive and emotional empathy separately, as discussed below.
1.3.1

Cognitive Empathy
The relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits is of particular interest in the cur-

rent study, as findings related to this relationship may suggest important methodological considerations.
Baron-Cohen (1997) suggested that the social-communication impairments that characterize ASD result
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from an impairment in ToM. A large number of studies have examined cognitive empathy impairments
in individuals with ASD using a variety of different measures. Some use self-report measures such as the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). Others use behavioral tasks, which may involve emotional or cognitive perspective-taking. Emotional perspective-taking, or affect naming, tasks include
emotion recognition paradigms such as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), the Reading the Mind in the Voice task (Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, &
Wheelwright, 2002), and the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008), in which one must identify feelings based on pictures of eyes, audio recordings, or photographs of individuals in emotional situations, respectively.
There are various ToM tasks involving cognitive perspective-taking. These include false belief
tasks, which take a variety of forms but typically involve inferring what others will assume in unexpected
situations. A simple but well-known example is the Smarties task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987),
which involves children looking into a Smarties container and finding unexpected contents, such as pencils. They then indicate what others would expect to find in the container, which requires considering
others’ perspectives in lieu of their own knowledge. More advanced ToM tasks include the Strange Stories test, in which individuals read stories and answer questions involving inference about a character’s
thoughts, feelings, or intentions (Happé, 1994), and the Faux Pas test (Simon Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan,
Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), in which one must answer questions about characters, speech, or behaviors in a story involving awkward situations. A few studies have used moral judgments to identify
whether or not individuals consider the actor’s intentionality as a measure of perceptive-taking (Moran
et al., 2011). Studies comparing performances on these measures between individuals with and without
ASD are reviewed below, followed by the few studies that have looked continuously at a relationship
between cognitive empathy and ASD traits.
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Comparison of individuals with ASD to individuals without ASD. Adults with ASD have been
shown to consistently self-report impairments in cognitive empathy on the IRI (Bellebaum, Brodmann, &
Thoma, 2014; Bird et al., 2010; Dziobek et al., 2008; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Yaniv, & Aharon-Peretz, 2002). This
finding indicates that individuals with ASD tend to be aware of their difficulties with cognitive empathy.
However, performances on behavioral tasks have been somewhat less consistent and are reviewed next.
Adults with ASD tend to have difficulty with cognitive empathy tasks that involve inferring others’ emotional states. For example, various studies have found that adults and adolescents with ASD
were impaired in accurately identifying emotional states based on the Reading the Mind in the Voice
task (Golan et al., 2007; Kleinman et al., 2001; Rutherford et al., 2002), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
task (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Golan et al., 2007; Kleinman et al., 2001; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007), and the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008; Mazza et al.,
2014). In general, findings support a deficit in individuals with ASD regarding inference of emotional
state.
Adults with ASD tend to pass simpler false belief tasks (i.e., identifying false belief) that children
with ASD fail (Kleinman et al., 2001; Moran et al., 2011), with a few exceptions (White, Coniston, Rogers,
& Frith, 2011) that may be driven by impairments in a small subset of individuals (Ozonoff, Pennington,
& Rogers, 1991). Senju and colleagues (2009) used eye tracking to show that although a NT group’s eye
movements anticipated a person’s behavior based on inference into their mental states during a false
belief task, the ASD group did not show this anticipation of the actor’s behavior providing further evidence of false belief impairment in adults with ASD. In contrast, tasks reflecting higher level ability to
attribute mental states to others more consistently suggest impairment in adults with ASD. For example,
impairments have been demonstrated during the Strange Stories task (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab,
Wolf, & Convit, 2007; Spek et al., 2010; White et al., 2011), during faux-pas tests (Gleichgerrcht et al.,
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2013; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2002; Spek et al., 2010; White et al., 2011), and when attributing mental
states to interactions between animated shapes (Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; White et al.,
2011). Furthermore, when asked to make moral judgments about accidental and intentional harm, a
group of individuals with ASD seemed not to consider intentionality in the person’s actions, in contrast
with the NT group (Moran et al., 2011), reflecting impaired perspective-taking ability. These findings together support the existence of a cognitive empathy impairment in individuals with ASD.
However, findings have not been entirely consistent across studies, as some have not found
cognitive empathy impairments in adults with ASD. Most notably, some studies have found that individuals with ASD were not impaired on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, although they were impaired
on more naturalistic ToM tasks (Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001) and more situational perspective-taking tasks including the Strange Stories Test and Faux Pas Test (Spek et al., 2010). Baron-Cohen
(1997) and Roeyers (2001) suggest that these more advanced and naturalistic ToM tasks rely on EF, indicating that variability in EF ability may also explain inconsistent findings (see Section 1.4.1). Taken together, adults with ASD may be more likely to be impaired on more advanced ToM tasks than those involving inferring emotion from photographs.
Continuous relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits. A handful of studies have
explored relationships between cognitive empathy and ASD symptoms and traits continuously, rather
than comparing groups with and without ASD. In children and adolescents, reduced ToM ability has
been found to be associated with greater social-communication and repetitive behavior symptom severity (Joseph & Tager–Flusberg, 2004; Pasalich, Dadds, & Hawes, 2014; Peterson, Garnett, Kelly, & Attwood, 2009; Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Wallace et al., 2011). Fewer studies have explored this relationship in
adults, although there is some evidence that higher levels of ASD traits are associated with reduced ToM
in adulthood as well, in terms of self-reported cognitive empathy (Gökçen et al., 2014), performance on
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Gökçen et al., 2016; Golan et al., 2007), and perspective-taking
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for characters in a movie (Rot & Hogenelst, 2014). The current study expands on these findings by examining a continuous relationship between ASD traits and a well-validated cognitive empathy variable that
incorporates inference of mental state based on face, voice, and body language.
Possible foundations of cognitive empathy impairment. Several explanations for a cognitive empathy impairment in individuals with ASD have been hypothesized. Leslie and colleagues (2004) proposed the existence of an impaired ToM module that is both a cognitive construct and brain network
devoted to understanding mental states, and suggested that individuals with impairments in this network depend upon compensatory strategies for success on ToM tasks. Studies of impaired neurological
connectivity in relation to ToM deficits support this theory (Castelli et al., 2002). However, this theory
does not account for the negative association between cognitive empathy and ASD traits in individuals
without an ASD diagnosis (Gökçen et al., 2016, 2014). In contrast, it is possible that variability in cognitive empathy in individuals with ASD is due to an association with other domain-general skills, namely EF
(Marcovitch et al., 2015). Evidence in support of this proposition is presented below (Section 1.4.1).
Therefore, it is possible that variability in EF ability mediates the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits.
The current study builds on previous findings by considering a continuous relationship between
ASD traits and performance on a measure of cognitive empathy that involves inference of mental state
based on face, voice, and body language. This investigation is consistent with the theory that ASD traits
are continuous in the general population (Constantino, 2011), and will improve on previous studies that
largely use a categorical comparison between groups with and without ASD. Studies examining another
aspect of empathy, emotional empathy, in relation to ASD traits are also explored below.
1.3.2

Emotional Empathy
Baron-Cohen (2003) suggested that empathy must encompass a more complex range of skills

than just recognition of mental states, as people may recognize emotions and predict behavior without
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demonstrating that they care about or experience the other person’s feelings. This addition of responding to and experiencing the person’s emotions differentiates emotional empathy from cognitive empathy. Few studies have examined emotional empathy in adults in relation to ASD traits.
To this author’s knowledge, the continuous relationship between emotional empathy and ASD
traits in adults has not been examined. However, examination of emotional empathy in adults with ASD
compared to those without ASD has received some limited attention, and findings have been mixed.
Deficits have been identified based on self-report questionnaires (IRI; Mathersul et al., 2013) and ratings
of emotional responses to pictures that corresponded to different neural activation (Schulte-Rüther et
al., 2011). In contrast, studies have also found no emotional empathy impairment in individuals with
ASD based on self-report questionnaires (Bellebaum et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2007), ratings of emotional reactions to pictures (Dziobek et al., 2008), and activation in neuroimaging (Bird et al., 2010).
Differences in findings across these studies may be explained by methodological differences. In
particular, some use self-report measures of daily life (Rogers et al., 2007), whereas others use selfreport during behavioral tasks (Dziobek et al., 2008) or observed responses to stimuli (Scambler, Hepburn, Rutherford, Wehner, & Rogers, 2007). Self-report measures are limited in that they rely on one’s
ability to reflect on and make generalized statements based on one’s own behavior, rather than identifying real-time responses to emotional content. In contrast, some studies only consider observational information, such as viewing an individual’s response to an emotional situation (e.g., Bacon et al., 1998).
However, emotions expressed are not always identical to emotions experienced (Ekman, 1993). Taken
together, studies would be improved by considering both self-reported and observed emotional empathy.
Furthermore, the tasks used in these studies involved viewing static pictures of people’s faces
(Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011) or of individuals in emotional situations (Dziobek et al., 2008). Participants
were then asked to rate their level of empathic concern for the individual. Therefore, these tasks rely on
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use of visual cues only and require a level of insight into one’s own experience to report empathic concern. Therefore, use of a more naturalistic emotional empathy measure would provide additional insight
into the relationship between emotional empathy and ASD traits. Finally, variable findings may be explained by the valence of stimuli in the different tasks, as discussed below.
Positive and negative empathy. Different valences of stimuli across studies may help to explain
variable findings. Studies of NT individuals suggest that positive empathy may be processed differently
from negative empathy (Mirabito, Taiwo, Bezdek, & Light, 2019; Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2014),
and findings from behavioral studies suggest that empathic engagement may differ by valence of the
content (Dziobek et al., 2008; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011). With regard to the studies mentioned above,
Schulte-Rüther and colleagues’ (2011) empathy-evoking stimuli included positive elements (i.e., happy
faces), negative elements, and neutral expressions, and their results revealed empathy impairments. In
contrast, Dziobek and colleagues (2008) analyzed only negative stimuli in their study, and findings
demonstrated intact empathy. Furthermore, some research suggests that recognition of negative emotions may be harder than recognition of happiness (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Wallace et al., 2011).
Thus, happy faces may be easier to recognize and label, but may evoke less emotional empathy in the
viewer with ASD.
These studies highlight the need to further investigate patterns of impairments in positive and
negative emotional empathy in relation to ASD traits using naturalistic empathy measures. Better understanding of empathic responses would help to clarify our knowledge of forces driving impairments,
and may lead to the development of targeted interventions. Findings across studies have been variable
which is likely due to the valence of stimuli used in different studies, differences in the level of realism of
the tasks, and differential use of self-reported and observed empathy. Therefore, the current study examines emotional empathy in adults using a naturalistic task that considers positive and negative emotional empathy separately in relation to ASD traits. It also considers different responses when using self-
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reported versus observed emotional empathy. Patterns in emotional empathy findings will be further
explored below in consideration of studies that examined both cognitive and emotional empathy.
1.3.3

Emotional and cognitive empathy measured within single studies
Several studies have examined both cognitive and emotional empathy within single studies, al-

lowing for comparison between tasks and identification of response patterns. Many of these studies
have found a dissociation between impaired cognitive empathy and intact emotional empathy in participants with ASD.
This pattern of impaired cognitive empathy and intact emotional empathy has been found both
with use of self-report questionnaires (Bellebaum et al., 2014) and with behavioral tasks. For example,
Rogers and colleagues (2007) found that adults with ASD were impaired in cognitive empathy during
both a behavioral task and self-report questionnaire; however, they were not impaired in emotional
empathy when using a self-report measure (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980) and an emotional empathy behavioral task was not used. In a follow-up study using the Multifaceted Empathy Test
(MET), a measure involving viewing static images of distressing situations which was designed to be
more ecologically valid than a questionnaire, Dziobek and colleagues (2008) confirmed that adults with
ASD were impaired in cognitive, but not emotional, empathy. Interestingly, when using a similar paradigm involving viewing pictures of people expressing emotions, Schulte-Rüther and colleagues (2011,
2014) found the opposite pattern. Specifically, the ASD group’s labels of others’ emotions (cognitive
empathy) were accurate, but ratings of their own emotional responses (emotional empathy) were less
accurate. However, the task instructions ask how the participant feels when looking at the face in the
stimuli, which may result in a different reaction from empathy. For example, the participant may feel
afraid when looking at an angry face, rather than feeling empathically angry. Therefore, the tasks used in
these studies may not have accurately elicited emotional empathy.
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An additional explanation for discrepant findings is the difference between the cognitive empathy tasks. Schulte-Rüther’s task is primarily an emotion recognition task involving judgment of isolated
facial expressions. In contrast, Dziobek’s task involves pictures of individuals in a context in which they
are experiencing emotions (e.g., in a hospital), and ASD participants had difficulty labeling the emotions.
This difference would suggest that perhaps basic emotion recognition is intact in some individuals with
ASD, consistent with some findings discussed above in Section 1.3.1, whereas context and background
details may detract attention from the pictured person’s emotional expression. Taken together, the patterns across studies may suggest that having more context, such as seeing a sad person in a hospital,
may support emotional empathy by providing a context for one’s emotion, whereas faces in isolation
may not evoke strong empathic responses.
Further support for the dichotomy between cognitive and emotional empathy is found in literature comparing deficits of individuals with ASD and those with psychopathy or conduct disorder with
callous-unemotional traits. This body of findings generally suggests that individuals with ASD are impaired on measures of cognitive but not emotional empathy, whereas individuals with psychopathy or
conduct disorder with callous-unemotional traits are impaired on measures of emotional but not cognitive empathy (Blair, 2008; Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013; Schwenck et al., 2012). However, these theories emphasize that emotional empathy may still
be impaired in individuals with ASD (Blair, 2005).
In contrast, some have identified impairments in both cognitive and emotional empathy in
adults with ASD. However, these findings have primarily been based on self-reported cognitive and emotional empathy ratings on the IRI (Mathersul et al., 2013) and EQ (Hadjikhani et al., 2014; Mathersul et
al., 2013). Therefore, individuals with ASD may notice difficulties in both domains within their everyday
lives, whereas performances on behavioral tasks do not consistently suggest impairments in both domains. Both the IRI and EQ demonstrate good psychometric poperties and allow for separate examina-
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tion of cognitive and emotional empathy. However, both self-report measures are subject to bias and
limited insight, suggesting that behaveioral examination of these domains would provide additional information.
The only studies to this author’s knowledge that examined continuous relationships between
ASD traits and both cognitive and emotional empathy involved NT adults presenting with a range of ASD
traits. Gökçen and colleagues’ (2016) findings indicated that ASD traits were related to performance on
a naturalistic ToM task but not on an emotional empathy task involving rating emotional responses to
pictures of faces. As noted above (see Section 1.3.2), this type of task may not accurately measure emotional empathy. In contrast, another study examining NT individuals with subclinical ASD traits found
that lower cognitive empathy was associated with higher ASD traits, but only in those reporting lower
trait emotional empathy (Rot & Hogenelst, 2014). Additional research is warranted to explore the relationships between ASD traits and both cognitive and emotional empathy within adults with a range of
ASD traits.
As noted in previous sections, variable findings are likely attributable to differences in methodology for both cognitive and emotional empathy. In particular, studies vary in their examination of selfreported versus observed empathy, naturalistic versus static stimuli, and positive versus negative stimuli. Surprisingly, in single studies examining both cognitive and emotional empathy, none have used naturalistic emotional empathy paradigms. Instead, they have used static images or self-report questionnaires. However, use of ecologically valid tasks would add confidence to findings. The current study aims
to investigate the differential relationships between cognitive empathy and ASD traits, and emotional
empathy and ASD traits, by addressing these limitations of previous studies. It also builds on previous
findings by exploring whether or not EF mediates these relationships; as such, relationships between EF
and ASD traits, as well as between EF and empathy, are discussed next.
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1.4

Executive Functions and ASD
Executive functions (EF) are cognitive abilities necessary for guiding flexible, goal-oriented be-

haviors (Pellicano, 2013). These abilities include cognitive flexibility or set-shifting, inhibition, planning,
working memory, and problem-solving. It has been proposed that EF may be associated with empathy,
and thus may explain variability in empathic abilities (Iacono et al., 2015; Ze, Thoma, & Suchan, 2014). In
particular, the relationship between EF and ASD traits is reviewed below, as this relationship provides
the first indication that EF may explain the association between empathy and ASD traits. The relationships between EF and empathy are subsequently reviewed.
Individuals with ASD often experience impairments in EF (Hill, 2004). Impairments in EF have
even been proposed as a core component of the social, communication, and repetitive symptoms common in ASD (Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008). Although the majority of the literature tends
to examine EF impairments in children with ASD, some have examined deficits in adults with ASD. In
particular, cognitive inflexibility (Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006; Bramham et al., 2009;
Lopez et al., 2005; Ozonoff et al., 2004, 1991) and poor planning (Ambery et al., 2006; Barnard, Muldoon, Hasan, O’Brien, & Stewart, 2008; Bramham et al., 2009; Lopez et al., 2005; Ozonoff et al., 2004,
1991) have been identified in individuals with ASD, even more so than in other developmental disorders
such as ADHD (Hill, 2004; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). However, there is also evidence of impaired initiation (Bramham et al., 2009), working memory (Barnard et al., 2008), generativity (Ambery et al.,
2006), and increased perseveration (Lopez et al., 2005; Ozonoff et al., 1991) in individuals with ASD.
In contrast, a small number of studies have not found evidence of these EF impairments in
adults with ASD (Gilbert, Bird, Brindley, Frith, & Burgess, 2008; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000; Sachse et al.,
2013). Some explanations for these different findings include age differences across samples, such as
inclusion of adults only or addition of adolescents (Sachse et al., 2013), and differences in tasks, such as
between traditional neuropsychological measures (Barnard et al., 2008; Lopez et al., 2005) and comput-
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erized measures developed for particular studies such as use in an MRI scanner (Gilbert et al., 2008). In
general, studies of individuals with ASD find EF impairments, although the particular domains affected
vary between studies.
ASD symptoms are thought to be driven by impairments in EF skills, such as shifting, inhibiting,
and being flexible (Turner, 1997), and thus these domains are likely associated. For example, in the social-communication domain, it is possible that individuals with ASD find it difficult to inhibit their own
points of view and automatic responses, and may have difficulty flexibly shifting to consider others’ perspectives and respond appropriately. Similarly, these abilities seem to relate to the restricted and repetitive behaviors domain, including adoption of restricted interests and adherence to routines. Specifically,
it may be difficult to inhibit the urge to discuss topics of one’s own interest, and to be flexible when one
prefers routine.
EF abilities have been found to be associated with continuous ASD symptoms and traits. In
adults, impairments in inhibition (Gökçen et al., 2016; Lopez et al., 2005), planning (Bramham et al.,
2009; Gökçen et al., 2016), and in cognitive flexibility (Gökçen et al., 2016; Lopez et al., 2005) have garnered the most support. However, other facets of EF have also been found to be associated with ASD
symptoms, including working memory (Lopez et al., 2005); semantic fluency, divided auditory attention,
behavioral regulation (Kenworthy, Black, Harrison, Rosa, & Wallace, 2009); and initiation and strategy
formation (Bramham et al., 2009). Furthermore, EF composite scores from report of daily executive dysfunction on the Behavior Rating Inventory for Executive Functions (BRIEF; Gioia & Isquith, 2011) have
also been associated with ASD symptoms (Kenworthy et al., 2009; Leung, Vogan, Powell, Anagnostou, &
Taylor, 2016).
Overall, findings of previous studies support an inverse relationship between EF and ASD traits.
Literature considering the relationships between EF and empathy will be explored next, as existence of
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this relationship also lend support to the suggestion that EF may explain the relationship between empathy and ASD traits.
1.4.1

EF and Cognitive Empathy
Theorists have suggested that EF skills and cognitive empathy are interrelated. Russell (1998)

argued that EF development is necessary for ToM development, as ToM tasks require remembering
sequences and inhibiting automatic responses (Senju, 2012), and they require cognitive flexibility in order to alternate effectively between one’s own perspective and the character’s perspective (Carlson &
Moses, 2001). On the other hand, executive skills have been thought to rely on metarepresentational
capacity related to ToM (Perner, 1998), as managing both internal experiences and internal representations of the outer world facilitates EF. Both of these theories suggest an important relationship between
cognitive empathy and EF, and the literature supporting this relationship is summarized.
Some studies have found impairments in cognitive empathy and in EF in individuals with ASD.
One study found that in a group with ASD, ToM and auditory working memory were both impaired, although authors did not examine direct associations between these measures (Holdnack, Goldstein, &
Drozdick, 2011). In a landmark study, Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers (1991) compared a group of NT
adults to those with high-functioning ASD on tasks of EF and ToM. They found that the group with ASD
was impaired on EF tasks of cognitive flexibility, planning, and inhibition, as well as on ToM tasks. However, it is notable that the study included several measures in their ToM composites that do not directly
measure ToM and are no longer widely used to study ToM, such as answering questions about mental
and behavioral functions of the brain. Nonetheless, these studies begin to suggest that both cognitive
empathy and EF are impaired in individuals with ASD.
Other studies have gone further to identify relationships between specific EF domains and ToM.
Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2010) found that in a NT group, lower working memory and divided attention
contributed to reduced ToM ability, suggesting that ToM requires significant attentional capacity and
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ability to hold and manipulate mental information. Furthermore, Ahmed and Miller (2011) found that
verbal fluency and deductive reasoning predicted performance on the Strange Stories task, and that
verbal fluency, problem solving, and gender predicted performance on the Faux Pas Test. Overall, support has been provided for the assertion that EF and ToM are related. However, the particular EF domains found to be related to ToM have differed significantly among studies of adults with ASD.
Only three studies to this author’s knowledge have considered the relationships among EF, cognitive empathy, and ASD symptoms in individuals with ASD, and all have focused on children or adolescents. One found that ToM and EF together are associated with ASD symptoms (Joseph & Tager–
Flusberg, 2004), whereas EF alone was not associated with symptoms. The other two studies found no
relationships among ToM, EF, and symptoms (Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006) or found only
EF to be related to symptoms (Pellicano, 2013). Findings appear to differ primarily due to methodology;
Pellicano’s (2013) study examined longitudinal relationships among domains over a 3 year span, whereas the other studies were cross-sectional. It is possible that the longitudinal associations among these
domains are different from cross-sectional associations as these skills may change throughout development. Furthermore, the two cross-sectional studies differed in their measures of ASD traits; Pellicano
and colleagues (2006) used a parent-report measure of ASD symptoms, whereas Joseph and TagerFlusberg (2004) used an observational and interactive measure. Due to these very inconsistent findings,
the relationships among these domains and symptoms warrant further examination, particularly in
adults in whom these relationships have not yet been explored.
When NT adults with varying levels of ASD traits have completed cognitive empathy and EF
tasks, findings have demonstrated that greater levels of ASD traits were associated with poorer cognitive empathy and cognitive flexibility compared to those with lower traits (Gökçen et al., 2016, 2014).
Also, static ToM performance (i.e., the Reading the Mind In the Eyes Test) was related to cognitive flexibility and planning, and more naturalistic ToM tasks (15-minute movies showing social situations) were
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related to these domains as well as inhibition (Gökçen et al., 2016). Furthermore, although ASD traits
were related to a naturalistic ToM task, ASD traits were not uniquely associated with the static ToM test,
further supporting the assertion that naturalistic tasks may provide a more sensitive measure of empathy than static images. In general, this study provides evidence of the relationships among ASD traits,
cognitive empathy, and EF.
Overall, despite variability in the specific domains indicated, EF is generally found to be associated with various cognitive empathy tasks. This conclusion, in conjunction with the relationship established above between cognitive empathy and ASD traits, supports the hypothesis that EF may explain
the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits. However, these complex relationships have
not yet been examined and are addressed in the current study.
1.4.2

EF and Emotional Empathy
Considering the variability in emotional empathy skills in individuals with ASD, it is surprising

that so few studies have examined a relationship between EF and emotional empathy in this population.
This relationship has been more thoroughly investigated in NT adults. Support for overlapping brain regions has been provided (Menon & Uddin, 2010), as well as relationships on behavioral tasks between
emotional empathy and inhibitory control (Ze et al., 2014). Iacono and colleagues (2015) also found that
inhibitory control moderated the relationship between empathy on the EQ- short form and social functioning, such that those with higher empathy had worse social outcomes in the context of worse inhibitory control.
In a sample of NT individuals varying in levels of ASD traits, EF was not related to performance
on an affective empathy task (Gökçen et al., 2016). Interestingly, although they found that naturalistic
videos were more sensitive measures of ToM than static pictures, the authors only used emotional responses to static images of faces to measure emotional empathy. Therefore, it remains possible that
dynamic videos may provide a more sensitive measure of emotional empathy than pictures, and that
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empathy for more realistic stimuli would be associated with EF ability. Therefore, additional research
should examine the relationships between emotional empathy and ASD traits.
Overall, research on the relationship between emotional empathy and EF in relation to ASD
traits is clearly lacking. Preliminary evidence suggests that there could be associations between EF and
emotional empathy, but this evidence is quite limited. However, this relationship should be further explored because it could contribute to the understanding of variability in emotional empathy in individuals with ASD. In particular, it is possible that those who are impaired in emotional empathy are also impaired in their ability to switch flexibly between cognitive sets or inhibit automatic responses, whereas
those with stronger emotional empathy may also experience stronger EF. This relationship has interesting theoretical implications regarding the role of EF in emotional empathy and ASD symptoms, and
would begin to provide information toward future research on intervention targets for adults with ASD.
The current study will explore this relationship, as well as the possibility that EF explains the relationship
between emotional empathy and ASD traits.
1.5

Current Study
Based on the findings reviewed above, there is evidence of relationships between cognitive em-

pathy and ASD traits, between cognitive empathy and EF, and between EF and ASD traits. The current
study builds on previous research by examining the role of EF as a possible mediator of the relationship
between cognitive empathy and ASD traits. Furthermore, some support has been provided for a relationship between emotional empathy and ASD traits, and few studies have explored relationships between emotional empathy and EF. The current study examines these relationships and explores whether
EF mediates the relationship between emotional empathy and ASD traits in NT adults, while considering
positive and negative emotional empathy separately.
In the current study, cognitive empathy is measured with a task that involves inferring mental
state based on face and voice, and emotional empathy is measured using self-reported and observed
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responses to realistic videos of positive and negative emotional scenarios that have been found to evoke
empathy in NT individuals (Light et al., 2015). ASD traits are measured using a widely used reliable and
valid self-report measure. Individuals also completed a neuropsychological battery, including reliable,
valid, and widely used cognitive and EF tasks. These measures provide the ability to test the proposed
relationships among empathy, EF, and ASD traits.
Furthermore, the current study examines these relationships in the general population with varying levels of ASD traits that do not reach clinical significance, consistent with the dimensional view that
suggests that ASD symptoms should be considered on a continuum in the general population rather
than based on categorical distinctions (Constantino, 2011).
This study is important for theoretical reasons. Of the domains considered in this study, cognitive empathy has received the most attention for its relationship to ASD traits, followed next by EF.
However, few studies have explored the relationships between these two domains while considering
their relationships with ASD traits, despite evidence that these skills are interrelated. It is important theoretically to advance our understanding of the relationships among these skills in order to better identify explanations for impairments. Compared to cognitive empathy and EF, emotional empathy has received little consideration in its relationship with ASD traits, particularly in adults. Therefore, it is unclear
the extent to which emotional empathy is impaired in relation to ASD traits, and whether EF skills are
important to empathic functioning or whether these are entirely separate domains. As a result, it is possible that overlooking emotional empathy has limited our current understanding of ASD. Greater understanding of the relationships among emotional empathy, EF, and ASD traits will build on our theoretical
understanding of factors likely influencing ASD traits.
1.5.1

Hypothesis 1: The relationships among cognitive empathy, EF, and ASD traits
Evidence has been provided that cognitive empathy is associated with ASD traits (Gökçen et al.,

2016, 2014; Golan et al., 2007; Wallace et al., 2011), suggesting that cognitive empathy impairments
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may relate to ASD symptomatology. See Figure 2 for visual representation of Hypothesis 1. It was expected that executive functioning, particularly working memory and cognitive flexibility, would partially
mediate the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits. Specifically, it was expected that
cognitive empathy would be positively associated with EF and negatively associated with ASD traits, and
that EF would be negatively associated with ASD traits. However, when accounting for EF, the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits was anticipated to be reduced. Therefore, it was considered likely that EF deficits would help to explain the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD
traits.
Specifically, strong cognitive empathy should be related to strong working memory (Holdnack et
al., 2011; Lin et al., 2010) and cognitive flexibility (Gökçen et al., 2016; Ozonoff et al., 1991) due to the
need to hold information in mind about the other person’s perspective and switch flexibly between
one’s own and the other’s perspective. Lower EF was predicted to relate to higher ASD traits, as reduced
flexibility and working memory was expected to relate to social deficits and engagement in repetitive
behaviors. Finally, lower cognitive empathy was expected to be associated with higher ASD traits as limited perspective-taking would likely be associated with difficulty having successful social interactions.
However, lower EF was predicted to partially account for this relationship as reduced flexibility and
working memory were expected to explain how perspective taking impairment relates to ASD traits.
1.5.2

Hypothesis 2: The relationships among emotional empathy, EF, and ASD traits
The second hypothesis sought to examine the relationships among emotional empathy, EF, and

ASD traits, with positive and negative emotional empathy examined separately. Some evidence has
been provided for relationships between emotional empathy and EF (Menon & Uddin, 2010; ShamayTsoory et al., 2002; Ze et al., 2014), between emotional empathy and ASD traits (Helt & Fein, 2016;
Scambler et al., 2007), and as previously stated, between EF and ASD traits. However, studies have failed
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to consider the relationships among all three domains. It was expected that EF would partially mediate
the relationship between emotional empathy and ASD traits.
Hypothesis 2A. In the case of positive emotional empathy, it was expected that attention would
partially mediate the relationship between positive empathy and ASD traits. Attention was selected due
to prior research regarding positive affect strengthening attentional skills (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005;
Goschke & Bolte, 2014). Although information regarding positive empathy specifically and EF was not
available in this study, it was expected that one with intact positive empathy would experience positive
affect. Positive empathy was expected to inversely relate to ASD traits, and attention was expected to
inversely relate to ASD traits.
Hypothesis 2B. Regarding negative emotional empathy, it was hypothesized that inhibition
would partially mediate the relationship between negative empathy and ASD traits (Iacono et al., 2015;
Ze et al., 2014). In particular, lower levels of negative empathy were expected to be associated with reduced inhibition of one’s own experience. Lower inhibition was then expected to be associated with
higher ASD traits, as difficulty inhibiting automatic responses can contribute to both socialcommunication and repetitive behavior symptoms. Lower negative empathy was expected to relate to
higher ASD traits, as reduced empathy was expected to be associated with difficulties in relationships.
However, reduced inhibition was expected to partially explain this relationship. This is because disinhibition of one’s own experience would be the pathway through which impaired negative empathy would
contribute to ASD traits.

23
Table 1. Findings from studies examining cognitive and/or emotional empathy impairment in adults and adolescents with ASD

Paper

Adult or
Child Study

N

Self-Report (or
parent report)
questionnaire

Behavioral Task

Includes
positive
empathy
component?
No

Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright,
2004

Adult

ASD=90
NT=90

Empathy
Quotient (EQ)

-

Bellebaum et
al., 2013

Adult
(M=27-30
years,
SD=5-5.7)

ASD=10
NT=12

German abbreviated version
of Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI)

Observational and active
learning tasks with EEG

No

Bird et al., 2010

Adult

ASD=18
NT=18

Toronto Alexithymia Scale
(TAS-20); Bermond-Vorst
Alexithymia
Scale (BVAQ);
IRI

No

Castelli et al.,
2002

Adult

ASD=10
NT=10

-

While in MRI scanner, participant is given pain stimulation of various degrees,
and partner (friend, romantic) sitting next to them
with hand visible is put in
pain in other conditions.
Participant rates how unpleasant they found partner’s pain
Describe mental states of
moving shapes during PET
task

Not reported

Cognitive
Empathy
Impairment

Emotional
Empathy
Impairment

Yes (on EQ that
measures both,
but not in separate scales)
Yes: cognitive
empathy impaired per selfreport; higher
cognitive empathy associated with impaired active
learning
No: alexithymia
rather than ASD
associated with
reduced activation in insular
cortex (for self
and other)

Yes (on EQ that
measures both,
but not in separate scales)
No: emotional
empathy not
impaired per
self-report

Yes: ASD group
used fewer and
less appropriate mental

-

No: no difference in empathic brain responses (insular
cortex) between
groups when
controlling for
alexithymia
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Dziobek et al.,
2008

Adult

ASD=17
NT=18

IRI

Gleichgerrcht et
al., 2013

Adult

ASD=36
NT=36

IRI

Golan et al.,
2006

Adult

ASD=50
NT=22

-

Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault,
2001

Adult

ASD=16
NT=24

-

Mathersul et al.,
2013

Adult

ASD=40
NT=37

IRI; EQ

Multifaceted Empathy Test
(MET): infer the emotional
state of person in pictures
of emotionally charged situations (cognitive) and rate
their own emotional reactions to the pictures (emotional)
Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test; Faux-pas test;
Responses to trolley problem and footbridge dilemma with personal and impersonal scenarios

No

Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Task; Reading the
Mind in the Voice Task
First order false belief task;
Identifying intonation of
speakers; Mental State
Eyes Task (identifying feelings based on pictures of
eyes)
The Awareness of Social
Inference Test (TASIT): video vignettes of conversations involving basic and
subtle emotions and conversational inferences
about use of sarcasm or
lies, based on words, tone,

Yes, but not
examined
separately
Yes, but not
examined
separately

No

No

state words
Yes: lower on
cognitive scales
of IRI and on
the MET

No: p=.05 on
Affective Empathy scale; higher
score on Personal Distress
scale; no difference on MET

Yes: increased
utilitarian
judgments of
personal scenarios associated with ToM
impairment on
Faux Pas test
Yes, and correlated with ASD
symptoms
Yes: passed
first-order task,
but impaired
on visual and
auditory tasks

Yes: increased
utilitarian moral
judgments of
personal scenarios (high
emotional saliency)

Yes: simple
ToM intact in
ASD group but
advanced ToM
(sarcasm and
deception)
were impaired
on TASIT; ToM

Yes: emotional
empathy scales
of IRI and EQ
impaired in ASD
group (but did
not explain
TASIT performance)

-

-
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facial expression, and gesture

Mazza et al.,
2014

Adolescent
(M=15
years)

ASD=15
NT=15

Basic Empathy
Scale—
Cognitive and
Affective Subscales

Moran et al.,
2011

Adult

Not reported

-

Roeyers et al.,
2001

Adults

ASD=24
NT=24

-

Rogers et al.,
2007

Adult

ASD=21
NT=21

IRI

First-order false belief task;
advanced ToM requiring
interpretation of lies, jokes,
misunderstanding, etc.;
Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Task; Emotion Attribution Task; MET
False belief task; making
moral judgments regarding
accidental and intentional
harm
Strange Stories Test: read
stories and answer questions involving inference
about a character’s
thoughts, feelings, or intentions (ToM task); Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Task;
Labeling feelings of interacting individuals in a video
Strange Stories Test

Yes, analyzed separately for
MET

No

No

Not reported

scales on IRI
and EQ associated with performance
Yes: ASD group
lower on false
belief and ToM
tasks and selfreport

Yes: same
judgments regardless of intentionality
Yes/No: Impaired on
Strange Stories
Task and video
task but not on
Eyes Test

Yes: lower on
cognitive scales
of IRI and on
Strange stories
task

Yes: negative
empathy impaired but positive empathy
not impaired;
ASD not lower
for self-report
-

-

No: Same as NT
group on Affective Empathy
scale (but nearly
significant,
p=.08) of IRI and
higher on Personal Distress
scale
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Rot & Hogenelst, 2014

Adult

NT=100
No ASD
(ASD
traits)

Balanced Emotional Empathy
Scale (BEES),
Berkeley Expressivity
Questionnaire
-

Self-report of empathic accuracy (cognitive) after
watching clips of emotional
people discussing events

No

Yes: cognitive
empathy impaired on behavioral task

Emotional empathy contributed to cognitive empathy
performance

Rutherford,
Baron-Cohen, &
Wheelwright,
2002
Schulte-Rüther
et al., 2011

Adult

ASD=19
NT=20

Identifying emotional
states of spoken sentences

Yes, but not
examined
separately

Yes: impaired
on Voice Test

-

Adult

ASD=18
NT=18

-

Infer the emotional state of
a person in pictures (other
task) and report emotions
they themselves feel when
viewing the pictures (self
task)

Yes, but not
examined
separately
(expressions
were happy,
sad, neutral)

No: labels of
others’ emotions were accurate

Adult

ASD=19
NT=17

-

Eye tracking during falsebelief task

No

Adolescent
(range 1218 years)

ASD=16
NT=16

IRI; Sociomoral
Reflection
Measure-Short
Form

Participants were asked to
describe a recent difficult
situation and discuss what
they did and why, describe
their strengths, indicate if
they were good at prosocial
moral behaviors, and discuss how they realized they
were not good at these behaviors

No

Yes: group did
not anticipate
actor’s behavior
No: qualitative
differences in
perspective
taking were not
significant

Yes: ratings of
their own emotional responses
were not congruent with
emotions in pictures; brain regions recruited
also differed
-

Senju et al.,
2009

Senland & HigginsD’Alessandro,
2013

No: did not differ on empathy
scales, though
ASD had lower
moral reasoning
and situations
were more
about social
isolation and
nonacceptance
and relied less

27

Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2002

Adolescent
(case study
age 17-18
years)

Spek et al., 2010 Adult

ASD=2
NT=6

IRI; Questionnaire Measure
of Emotional
Empathy

HFASD=32
AS=29
NT=32

EQ

Faux-pas test; recognition
of irony in stories describing interactions; recognition of facial expressions;
recognition of affective
prosody

Not reported

Yes: impaired
on cognitive
scale; detected
faux-pas but
did not cite
hurt feelings as
reasons and
recognition of
irony intact;
emotion recognition impaired
(one prosody,
one faces)
Yes, all tasks
impaired except Eyes task

on implicit
feedback as information
Yes: impaired
on emotional
empathy scale

Strange Stories Test: read
Not reportstories and answer quesed
tions involving inference
about a character’s
thoughts, feelings, or intentions (ToM task); Faux-pas
test: answer questions
about characters, speech,
or behaviors in a story being awkward; Reading the
Mind in the Eyes test
White et al.,
Adult
ASD=16
Identifying interactions be- Not reportYes: all tasks
2011
NT=15
tween shapes and selecting ed
impaired
emotions to reflect their
mental states; false belief
task; Strange Stories task
Note. ADOS=Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AS= Asperger Syndrome; DLD= developmental language delay; HFASD= high functioning
ASD; ID= intellectual disability; LD= learning disability; LFASD= low functioning ASD.

28

Figure 1. Proposed overall model of the relationships among empathy, EF, and ASD traits

+

-

Figure 2. Visual representation of Hypothesis 1
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+

-

+

-

Figure 3. Visual representation of Hypotheses 2A (top) and 2B (bottom)
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2
2.1

METHOD

Participants
Participants were adults aged 18 years and older. They were recruited from the metropolitan At-

lanta region using flyers, emails and listservs, social media, other websites, announcements, and phone
calls. Neurotypical participants were recruited, although individuals were not excluded for prior ASD diagnosis. Exclusion criteria included being a first-degree relative of another study participant, estimated
full scale IQ below 70, history of neurological condition or brain injury, diagnosis of a psychotic disorder,
visual or hearing impairment which would impede task completion, or inability to complete testing in
English. Participants were compensated $50 for completion of all tasks.
Power analysis for mediation was conducted as described by Schoemann and colleagues (2017).
This method used Monte Carlo bootstrapped confidence intervals, which allows the experimenter to
specify multiple parameters as needed and has been shown to perform well compared to other power
analysis methods (Schoemann et al., 2017). Using a target power of .80, 5,000 bootstrap replications,
and weak to moderate correlations found in the literature ranging from -.30 to -.54, (Gökçen et al.,
2014; Joseph & Tager–Flusberg, 2004; Lopez et al., 2005; Pellicano, 2013), a sample size of 57 participants was recommended for mediation models. In particular, effect sizes for power analysis were selected based on results of similar studies examining relationships between empathy and EF (Gökçen et
al., 2016, 2014), between empathy and ASD traits (Gökçen et al., 2016, 2014; Pellicano, 2013), and between EF and ASD traits (Joseph & Tager–Flusberg, 2004; Lopez et al., 2005).
A total of 60 adults participated in the study. One participant was excluded from analyses due to
performance in the impaired range on a qualifying task (i.e., CWIT Conditions 1 and 2). Therefore, a total
of 59 participants were included in analyses. See Table 2 for sample characteristics. Participants were
75% female, racially diverse (12% White, 54% Black, 34% Other races), and were primarily undergradu-
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ate students (64% undergraduate students, 24% completed undergraduate education, 10% graduate
school). Two participants reported having a previous ASD diagnosis, specifically Asperger’s syndrome,
although all participants reported levels of ASD traits that did not reach clinical significance (see Figure 4
for distribution of ASD traits in the sample). Of the two participants who reported prior ASD diagnosis,
one of them reported having had speech, physical, occupational, and ASD-specific therapies as a toddler. The other participant did not report participation in early intervention services.
2.2
2.2.1

Measures
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a 50-item self-report measure

intended to assess ASD traits in adults with intelligence in the normal range. Participants respond with
“yes” or “no” to each item, and all “yes” responses are summed to get a total score. Scores can range
from 0, suggesting no ASD traits, to 50, suggesting a high number of ASD traits. Domains of ASD traits
measured include social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communication, and imagination.
Items are based on the cognitive triad of symptoms (social, communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviors) from the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), thought to characterize individuals with ASD (Wing & Gould, 1979). Although DSM criteria have since been updated to combine social and communication symptoms into a single domain (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), basic
symptoms remain similar. Therefore, the AQ was considered to sufficiently measure ASD traits.
A score of 32 has been identified as a useful clinical cutoff, as 79.3% of the ASD group were
found to obtain this score or higher, whereas only 2% of controls obtained this score (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). In a normative sample of 58 adults with prior ASD diagnosis, 174
adults without ASD, 840 students, and 16 winners of a prestigious math competition, the AQ was able to
differentiate between ASD and non-ASD participants on overall score and sub-scores. The normative

32
sample was diverse in terms of sex, socioeconomic status, and areas of academic study, and scores in
the high-functioning group did not differ significantly based on sex. The AQ has demonstrated strong
psychometric properties, including test-retest reliability (r=0.7), internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=
0.63 to 0.77), and convergent validity with parent-reported ASD traits (M=2.8 point difference, SD=-0.6).
It has been used as a measure of ASD traits in a number of studies since its validation (e.g., Gökçen et
al., 2014), including use for confirming ASD diagnosis in research participants (Bellebaum et al., 2014;
Lombardo et al., 2007). In the current study, the AQ was used as a continuous measure of ASD traits.
2.2.2

Screening Measure
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence, Second Edition. The Wechsler Abbreviated

Scales of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler, & Hsiao-pin, 2011) is a brief measure of estimated intellectual ability for individuals aged 6 to 90. Two versions of the test are available: a two subtest version which takes about 15 minutes to administer, and a four subtest version which takes about
30 minutes to administer (McCrimmon & Smith, 2013). The current study used the two subtest version.
This version includes the Vocabulary subtest, a measure of verbal reasoning requiring individuals to verbalize word definitions, and the Matrix Reasoning Subtest, a measure of nonverbal reasoning requiring
individuals to select from choices a response that completes a visual pattern. Raw scores are converted
to T-scores for subtests, and subtest scores are combined to identify Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) Standard Scores
(SS). Higher scores represent stronger abilities.
In a normative sample of 2,300 examinees divided into 23 age groups with 100 participants
each, the WASI-II demonstrated strong psychometric properties in adults. This included test-retest reliability for subtests (r=0.90 to 0.92) and domain scores (r=0.94 to 0.97) as well as concurrent validity with
other measures of intelligence and achievement (e.g., WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2014). In the current study,
WASI-II FSIQ of 70 or greater was used as inclusion criteria as executive functioning tasks may be diffi-
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cult for those with well below average IQ, and the AQ was normed on a sample with IQ in the normal
range. No participants were excluded due to low IQ.
2.2.3

Cognitive Empathy Measure
Advanced Clinical Solutions. The Advanced Clinical Solutions (ACS; Pearson, 2009) Social Cogni-

tion is a test battery measuring aspects of social cognition for individuals aged 16 to 90. The current
study used three subtests from the Social Cognition test to form the “Total Social Perception” score: Affect Naming, Prosody-Face Matching, and Prosody-Pair Matching. The Affect Naming subtest requires
participants to choose an emotion word from a list to describe the emotional state expressed by a person’s pictured face. Prosody-Face Matching involves choosing a picture of a face from six choices to
match the prosody of a sentence heard from a CD. Finally, the Prosody-Pair Matching subtest involves
listening to a recorded sentence and choosing the appropriate interaction (including faces and body postures) from four pictures based on the prosody of the sentence. They must then indicate the emotion
that was expressed by the sentence and determine whether the tone changed the meaning of the sentence. Raw scores are converted to scaled scores, with higher scores reflecting better performance. A
“Total Social Perception” score integrating all three subtests was calculated and used as a continuous
measure of cognitive empathy in the current study.
The ACS used the same normative sample as was used for the WAIS-IV, which matched demographic make-up with results of the US Bureau of the Census in 2005 (Chu, Lai, Xu, & Zhou, 2012). The
Social Cognition test has demonstrated strong psychometric properties, including moderate to high internal consistency (0.69 to 0.96), high test-retest reliability (0.83), and high interrater reliability (98%;
Chu, Lai, Xu, & Zhou, 2012; Kandalaft et al., 2012). Convergent validity with several other tasks measuring social cognition has been established, including the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Chu et al.,
2012; Kandalaft et al., 2012). It has also been shown to discriminate between individuals with ASD and
others (Holdnack et al., 2011; Kandalaft et al., 2012).
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2.2.4

Emotional Empathy Measures
Empathic Response to Video Clips. An entire episode of the television show Extreme Makeover:

Home Edition was divided into 18 clips and presented to participants as described by Light and colleagues (2015). Clips showing a family in need of a remodeled home evoke negative emotions, such as
sadness, whereas other clips showing a family viewing the newly remodeled home evoke positive emotions, such as happiness. Two of the clips were considered to have neutral valence, four clips had negative valence, and 12 clips had positive valence. Therefore, more opportunity was provided to empathize
with positive than with negative emotion. Immediately after viewing each video clip, participants completed a self-report scale rating their own experience of various positive and negative feelings, including
joy, alarm, and worry on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). In the current study, average selfreport scores were calculated for positive empathy and negative empathy.
The video task and self-report questions were validated in a sample of 68 adult participants
(Light et al., 2015). Facial electromyographic (EMG) signs of empathic concern and empathic happiness
(i.e., measure of change in facial expression) during these video clips were found to be associated with
prosocial behavior and self-reported empathy in response to the clips. Furthermore, fronto-striatal circuitry activation on fMRI during this task was associated with trait empathy (Mirabito et al., 2019).
Participants’ faces were also recorded during this task and later coded for spontaneous facial
expressions. Facial expressions in response to emotional stimuli have previously been used as a measure
of emotional empathy (e.g., Scambler et al., 2007). Facial, vocal, or bodily reactions to stimuli were coded on a scale from 1 (absence of concern/happiness) to 4 (substantial concern/happiness demonstrated)
as described in Light and colleagues’ (2009) study. The codes were validated in the mentioned study,
and coders demonstrated high interrater reliability (κ =.72). Furthermore, electroencephalogram (EEG)
showed that codes of facial expressions were associated with frontal activation during empathy tasks. In
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the current study, these codes were used as an observational measure of empathic concern and happiness, with higher scores reflecting greater empathy.
In the current study, video clips were assigned empathy ratings by two trained independent
coders who reviewed recordings of the participants’ faces while watching the videos. Interrater reliability was determined between the coders using weighted kappas, which were selected given the number
of coders and ability to account for magnitude of disagreement between the raters (Hallgren, 2012).
Initial reliability was very high (Weighted κ=.95) following five commonly scored participants. Overall
reliability remained high (Weighted κ=.90), with 50% overlap between participants coded by the two
raters. Codes were averaged to create observed positive and negative empathy scores. Self-reported
and observed empathy were examined separately so as not to dilute information, as measures were not
strongly correlated (see Table 4) and because previous research suggests that these sources of information may yield different findings (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2008; Mathersul et al., 2013).
The Positive Empathy Scale. The Positive Empathy Scale (Light et al., 2015) is a 15-item selfreport measure intended to assess emotional empathy for positive emotions (e.g., I also feel good when
someone I know feels good). Participants read each statement and indicate on a Likert scale the extent
to which the item is true or untrue, with 1 being “extremely untrue,” 4 being “neither true nor false,”
and 7 being “extremely true.” Item responses were summed to obtain a total score, with higher scores
reflecting high empathic happiness. The measure was modeled after the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI; Davis, 1980), but adapted to measure only empathic happiness rather than sadness. Inter-item reliability was high (Cronbach’s alpha=0.92) and convergent validity with the EQ and IRI was confirmed by
Light and colleagues (2015). This scale was used as a self-report measure of daily positive empathy to
compare to self-reported empathy during the video task, and was selected due to its ability to measure
only positive emotional empathy rather than total emotional empathy.
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2.2.5

Executive Functioning Measures
WAIS-IV Digit Span. The Digit Span subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales, Fourth Edi-

tion (Wechsler, 2014) is a measure of simple attention and verbal working memory. It can be administered in about 5 minutes. It is divided into three tasks: digit span forward (simple attention), backward
(working memory), and sequencing (working memory; not administered in the current study). The forward condition requires listening to a string of two to ten digits and repeating them in the same order in
which they were heard. The backward condition is similar, except that participants are asked to repeat
the digits in reverse order. In all tasks, items begin with two digits and increase in difficulty. Psychometric properties are sufficient, with test-retest reliability of at least 0.70, inter-rater reliability of at least
0.90, and high concurrent validity (r=0.88) of the entire WAIS-IV measure with the Stanford-Binet IV
(Delaney & Hopkins, 1987) intelligence test. In the current study, digit span forward (DSF) was used as a
measure of attention, and digit span backward (DSB) was used as a measure of working memory.
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System. The Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System
(D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) is a battery of neuropsychological tests measuring executive
functions. The current study used three tasks from this battery (described below), including Verbal Fluency, the Color-Word Interference Test, and the Tower Test. The normative sample was based on 1,750
individuals ranging from age 8 to 89, and was racially and socioeconomically diverse. Psychometric
properties are sufficient; test-retest reliability for these subtests ranged from 0.62 to 0.80 and internal
consistency ranged from 0.32 to 0.90. The D-KEFS has been used in both clinical and research settings,
and has been shown to be sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction (Homack, Lee, & Riccio, 2005).
The Verbal Fluency test is a measure of semantic and phonemic fluency, as well as a measure of
cognitive flexibility. It has three conditions and takes less than 10 minutes to administer. In the phonemic fluency condition, participants are asked three times to name as many words as possible beginning
with a target letter in one minute. The semantic fluency condition is similar, except that they must name
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words that fall within two separate target categories. The switching condition requires one to name
words from alternating categories, and is thus a measure of cognitive flexibility. In the current study,
only the switching condition was used for analyses; however, data were collected for the semantic fluency condition to ensure that any impairment during the switching condition was due to difficulty with
cognitive flexibility and not due to difficulty with semantic fluency. Raw scores were converted to scaled
scores, with higher scores representing stronger abilities. In the current study, the score for total number of switches was used as a measure of cognitive flexibility. No participants were excluded due to
scores in the impaired range on both the semantic fluency and switching conditions.
The Color-Word Interference Test is a Stroop task with four conditions. It takes roughly 15
minutes to administer. It asks participants to, as quickly as possible, name the colors of squares (Condition 1), read color words (Condition 2), inhibit reading color words and instead read ink color (Condition
3), and to alternate between reading color words and naming ink color (Condition 4). Raw scores were
converted to scaled scores, with higher scores reflecting stronger performance. In the current study,
Condition 3 was used as a measure of inhibitory control. Conditions 1 and 2 were only administered to
ensure that any impairment on Condition 3 reflected difficulty with inhibitory control and not difficulty
with processing speed. One participant was excluded due to performance in the impaired range on Condition 1 and Condition 3, indicating that poor performance may have been due simply to poor speeded
naming ability.
The Tower Test is a measure of planning, which also involves components of working memory,
inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility. It takes about 15 to 20 minutes to administer. A participant is
presented with an apparatus with three pegs on it and with up to 5 discs of varying sizes. The participant
is then presented with the discs in a starting position, and an image of a final target position. They are
instructed to move the discs one at a time to the target position without putting a large disc on top of a
small disc, and using as few moves as possible. In the current study, the accuracy score, which assigns a
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score based on the number of moves required to complete items, was used as a measure of planning
and high level executive functioning. Raw scores were converted to scaled scores, with higher scores
reflecting stronger performance. Although this measure was not included in hypotheses, data were collected for exploratory analyses given previous findings that it may relate to variables of interest (e.g.,
Ambery et al., 2006; Bramham et al., 2009).
2.2.6

Background and History Questionnaire
A questionnaire was administered to each participant asking them to report basic demographic

information, diagnostic history, and information regarding exclusion criteria.
2.3

Procedure
Following recruitment, participants completed a brief screening process over the phone, to

check for exclusionary criteria. If participants were eligible for the study, they scheduled an appointment
at Georgia State University, which took 2 to 2.5 hours. When they arrived, they gave informed consent
and were given a brief overview about what to expect during testing. They first completed a background
questionnaire to obtain basic demographic information and again verify inclusion criteria. Next, they
completed the WASI-II, as this measure was important for study eligibility. Participants then continued
to complete the other tasks. First, participants completed behavioral assessments, including the cognitive empathy task and executive functioning tasks. The order of these was counterbalanced to control
for fatigue. After completing these tasks, participants completed the video task, followed by the AQ.
They completed the behavioral tasks first so that the questionnaire did not prime or impact their performance on behavioral empathy tasks. After completing all tasks, participants were thanked for their
time and were given $50. No participants were excluded during the testing session. One participant discontinued participation midway through the task due to technical difficulties; the participant was compensated at a rate of $15 per hour as described in the consent form.
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2.4

Statistical Plan
All analyses were completed using IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 25.

2.4.1

Assumptions
Assumptions of mediation were examined, which include the assumptions of general linear

models. These assumptions include linearity, normality, homogeneity of error variance, and independence of errors (Hayes, 2009). Normality was examined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Homogeneity
of variance was examined using visual inspection of P-P plots. Durbin-Watson test was used to assess
independence of residuals, and the Deviation from Linearity test in SPSS was used to determine if data
were linear. Multicollinearity was evaluated by examining the correlation matrix for very strong correlations. There are also several theoretical assumptions of mediation models, although these assumptions
are not testable and are mainly aimed at establishing causality (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007).
They include no reverse causality, minimization of measurement error, and no omitted variable that
causes the mediator and the outcome. None of these assumptions are considered to be violated in the
current study.
2.4.2

Preliminary Analyses
Descriptive statistics, including mean, standard deviation, and range for each variable of interest

were reported. Sex differences were examined using independent samples t-test. One-way ANOVA was
used to determine whether scores differed by administration order of tasks. A matrix of Spearman correlations is presented; Spearman correlations were selected as they are valid in the context of data that
violate assumptions of general linear models (de Winter, Gosling, & Potter, 2016). Correlations with
multiple variables within a mediation model were considered as covariates. IQ correlated with positive
self-reported empathy and attention, so it was examined as a covariate in the model for Hypothesis 2A.
However, it did not meaningfully change findings when it was included in the model.
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2.4.3

Hypothesis 1: Relationships among cognitive empathy, EF, and ASD traits
Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 2) considered whether EF partially mediates the relationship between

cognitive empathy and ASD traits. The mediation analyses were performed using Hayes’ PROCESS macro
for SPSS (2007), which evaluates each step of the mediation in accordance with Baron and Kenny’s
(1986) guidelines but using bootstrapped confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstraps to correct for bias
in estimates (Hayes, 2012). The model involves testing each leg of the mediation model as a linear regression. The indirect effect of M (mediator) on X and Y measures the amount of mediation present. If
the indirect effect is significant and the presence of the mediator reduces the relationship between X
(predictor) and Y (outcome; paths c-c’), then partial mediation is present. Each mediation model includes an empathy variable as X, ASD traits as Y, and an EF variable as M.
In this model, the ACS Social Perception score was used as a behavioral measure of cognitive
empathy, or the independent variable (X). The AQ total score provided the measure of ASD traits, or the
dependent variable (Y). The WAIS-IV Digit Span Backward score (working memory) and D-KEFS Verbal
Fluency Condition 3 number of switches (cognitive flexibility) were used as the EF measures, or mediating variables (M).
2.4.4

Hypothesis 2: Relationships among emotional empathy, EF, and ASD traits
Hypothesis 2 (see Figure 3) considered whether EF partially mediates the relationship between

emotional empathy and ASD traits. This hypothesis used separate models for positive (Hypothesis 2A)
and negative (Hypothesis 2B) emotional empathy. Self-reported and observed emotional empathy were
also examined separately as they were not highly correlated and due to the possibility of different findings using the two methods.
Each model was examined using the PROCESS macro as described above. For Hypothesis 2A, AQ
scores were the outcome, Digit Span Forward (attention) scores were the mediator, and the predictor
was observed positive emotional empathy in one model and self-reported positive emotional empathy
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in the other model. For Hypothesis 2B, AQ scores were the outcome, Color-Word Interference Test Condition 3 (inhibition) scores were the mediator, and the predictor was observed negative emotional empathy in one model and self-reported negative emotional empathy in the other model. Hypothesis 2B
failed the assumption of heteroscedasticity, so the Davidson-MacKinnon option was implemented during analyses. This method estimates standard error such that it is consistent with heteroscedasticity and
therefore does not require transformation of variables (Hayes, 2012).

Table 2. Sample characteristics
Characteristic
Total N
Age M(SD)
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Multi-Racial
Education Level
Number of years M(SD)
In college
College graduate
Graduate school
Unreported

N
59
22.31 (6.30)
15 (25%)
44 (75%)
7 (12%)
32 (54%)
6 (10%)
9 (15%)
5 (9%)
14.62 (1.90)
38 (64%)
14 (24%)
6 (10%)
1 (2%)
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Figure 4. Distribution of ASD traits in total sample

3
3.1

RESULTS

Preliminary analyses
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. There were no sex differences for any executive

functioning or empathy variables, ps>.05. A one-way ANOVA was completed to determine whether or
not administration order resulted in significantly different scores. Scores did not differ by administration
order for any variable, with the exception of cognitive empathy, F(3, 55)=3.38, p=.02. Therefore, administration order was controlled for in the analyses involving cognitive empathy. Correlation matrix (see
Table 4) indicated that IQ was significantly correlated with the majority of EF variables, but not with
most empathy variables or ASD traits. Specifically, full Scale IQ was positively correlated with attention
(Spearman’s ρ=.36, p=.005), working memory (Spearman’s ρ =.49, p<.001), inhibition (Spearman’s ρ
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=.53, p<.001), and planning (Spearman’s ρ =.42, p=.001). However, IQ was not correlated with empathy
variables, with the exception of a negative correlation with self-reported positive emotional empathy
(Spearman’s ρ =-.28, p=.03). IQ was generally not included as a covariate, as inclusion of an additional
variable would reduce power for analyses, except for Hypothesis 2A.
3.2

Correlations among variables of interest
Spearman correlations among demographic, cognitive, and empathic variables were examined, to

be valid in the context of data that violate assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality (de Winter et
al., 2016; see Table 4 for correlation matrix). Multiple executive functioning measures demonstrated
weak to moderate (Akoglu, 2018) positive correlations with each other, including inhibitory control with
attention (Spearman’s ρ =.32, p=.01), with working memory (Spearman’s ρ =.32, p=.01), and with planning (Spearman’s ρ =.40, p=.002). Also, working memory was correlated with attention (Spearman’s ρ
=.54, p<.001) and with planning (Spearman’s ρ =.27, p=.04). Finally, cognitive flexibility was positively
correlated with planning (Spearman’s ρ =.40, p=.002).
Regarding empathy variables, positive and negative emotional empathy were moderately positively correlated with each other for both observed (Spearman’s ρ =.58, p<.001) and self-reported empathy (Spearman’s ρ =.44, p<.001). Within positive emotional empathy, self-reported and observed
emotion were weakly to moderately positively correlated (Spearman’s ρ =.35, p=.007). Similarly, selfreported and observed negative emotional empathy were moderately positively correlated (Spearman’s
ρ =.41, p=.001). However, cognitive empathy did not significantly correlate with any emotional empathy
variables, ps>.05. The relationships between positive emotional empathy during the video task and the
self-report measure of daily positive emotional empathy were examined; weak to moderate positive
correlations were identified for self-reported (Spearman’s ρ=.34, p=.008) and observed (Spearman’s
ρ=.33, p=.01) positive emotional empathy. Furthermore, a moderate negative correlation was identified

between daily positive emotional empathy and ASD traits (Spearman’s ρ=-.43, p=.001).
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Inhibitory control was negatively correlated with self-reported positive (Spearman’s ρ =-.44,
p=.001), but not negative (Spearman’s ρ =-.11, p=.43), emotional empathy. Furthermore, planning weakly to moderately negatively correlated with both self-reported empathy variables, including positive
(Spearman’s ρ =-.31, p=.02) and negative (Spearman’s ρ =-.29, p=.03) empathy. In contrast, planning
weakly to moderately positively correlated with cognitive empathy (Spearman’s ρ =.34, p=.009). Additionally, self-reported positive empathy weakly negatively correlated with working memory (Spearman’s
ρ =-.29, p=.03).
3.3

Assumptions
Assumptions of mediation including linearity, normality, homogeneity of error variance, and inde-

pendence of errors (Hayes, 2009) were examined. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed that the majority
of EF and empathy variables were not normally distributed, ps<.05, with the exception of cognitive flexibility, D(59)=.11, p=.09, ASD traits, D(59) =.11, p=.06, and observed positive emotional empathy
D(59)=.08, p=.20. However, the mediation models in the current study use bootstrapping methods,
which eliminate the necessity of normality and thus do not require data transformation (Hayes, 2012).
Correlation matrix reveals that multicollinearity is not present among the variables (see Table 4). DurbinWatson test indicated that residuals are independent, and all analyses had nonsignificant deviations
from linearity. Two models violated the assumption of homoscedasticity; the models with self-reported
and observed negative emotional empathy as X demonstrated homoscedasticity. Hayes’ PROCESS macro
used in the current study provides the Davidson-MacKinnon option for including a standard error estimator that is consistent with heteroscedasticity and therefore does not require transformation of variables (Hayes, 2012). This option was implemented for these two mediation models. Overall, assumptions
were not violated, with the exception of homoscedasticity in two models, which was addressed statistically.

45
3.4

Hypothesis 1: Relationships among cognitive empathy, executive functions, and ASD traits
In this proposed mediation model, none of the paths are statistically significant (see Table 5 and

Figure 5). Cognitive empathy does not predict ASD traits, b=.07, t(57)=.25, p=.80, indicating that path c is
not significant, F(1, 57)=.06, p=.80, R2=.001. The a path is not significant, as cognitive empathy is not associated with working memory, F(1, 57)=.41, p=.52, R2=.007, or with cognitive flexibility, F(1, 57)=.07,
p=.79, R2=.001. Path b is not significant, F(1, 57)=.46, p=.71, R2=.02, as working memory, b=-.03, t(57)=.10, p=.92, and cognitive flexibility, b=.29, t(57)=1.14, p=.26, are not associated with ASD traits when
controlling for cognitive empathy. The direct effect of cognitive empathy on ASD traits (path c’) is not
significant, b=.08, t(57)=.29, p=.77. Finally, the indirect effects of working memory, b=-.002, 95% CI [-.09,
.06] and cognitive flexibility, b=-.01, 95% CI [-.14, .16] on the relationship between cognitive empathy
and ASD traits are not significant. Therefore, no significant associations are present and no partial mediation is present in the model. Controlling for administration order did not meaningfully change the
model (see Table 6).
3.5

Hypothesis 2A: Relationships among positive emotional empathy, attention, and ASD traits
Two separate mediation models were examined to test Hypothesis 2A to allow for self-reported

and observed emotional empathy to be explored independently. Therefore, one model included selfreported positive emotional empathy as X, whereas the other model included observed positive emotional empathy as X. See Figure 6 for visual representations of these models.
3.5.1

Self-Reported positive emotional empathy as X
Attention was examined as a partial mediator of the relationship between self-reported positive

emotional empathy and ASD traits (see Table 7 and Figure 6). In this model, the c path was significant. In
other words, high self-reported positive emotional empathy predicted low ASD traits, F(1, 57)=4.79,
p=.03, R2=.08. Specifically, for every one-unit increase in self-reported empathy, ASD traits decreased by
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2.4 units, b=-2.40, t(57)=-2.19, p=.03. In contrast, the a and b paths were not significant. In particular,
self-reported positive emotional empathy, b=-.45, t(57)=-.90, p=.37, was not significantly associated
with attention, F(1, 57)=.82, p=.37, R2=.01. Furthermore, attention, b=.05, t(57)=.15, p=.88, was not significantly associated with ASD traits when controlling for positive empathy, F(1, 57)=2.37, p=.10, R2=.08.
The direct effect of self-reported emotional empathy on ASD traits (path c’) is significant, b=-2.38,
t(57)=-2.14, p=.04, consistent with findings for path c. However, the indirect effect of attention on this
relationship is not significant, b=-.02, 95% CI [-.44, .32], indicating that partial mediation is not present.
Therefore, high self-reported positive emotional empathy predicts low ASD traits, but this relationship is
not mediated by attentional ability.
3.5.2

Observed positive emotional empathy as X
As above, attention was examined as a partial mediator of the relationship between positive

emotional empathy and ASD traits, although in this model, directly observed rather than self-reported
positive emotional empathy was examined as X (see Table 8 and Figure 6). None of the paths were significant in this model. Specifically, path c was not significant, as observed positive emotional empathy,
b=-1.33, t(57)=-1.12, p=.27, was not associated with ASD traits, F(1, 57)=1.5, p=.27, R2=.02. Path a was
not significant as observed positive emotional empathy, b=-.07, t(57)=-.12, p=.90, was not significantly
associated with attention, F(1, 57)=.02, p=.90, R2=.0003. Path b was not significant as attention, b=.11,
t(57)=.38, p=.70, was not significantly associated with ASD traits when controlling for observed positive
emotional empathy, F(1, 57)=.69, p=.51, R2=.02. The direct effect of observed positive emotional empathy on ASD traits (path c’) was not significant, b=-1.33, t(57)=-1.10, p=.27, consistent with findings of
path c. The indirect effect of attention on the relationship between observed positive emotional empathy and ASD traits was not significant, b=-.008, 95% CI [-.39, .40]. Therefore, attention did not mediate
the relationship between observed positive emotional empathy and ASD traits, and no significant associations were present within the model.
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3.6

Hypothesis 2B: Relationships among negative emotional empathy, inhibitory control, and ASD
traits
Two separate mediation models were examined to test this hypothesis. One model included

self-reported negative emotional empathy as X, whereas the other model included observed negative
emotional empathy as X. See Figure 7 for visual representations of these models. These models violated
the assumption of homoscedasticity. As a result, the Davidson-MacKinnon option of the PROCESS macro
was used, which renders analyses robust to heteroscedasticity (Hayes, 2012).
3.6.1

Self-reported negative emotional empathy as X
Inhibitory control was examined as a potential mediator of the relationship between self-

reported negative emotional empathy and ASD traits (see Table 9 and Figure 7). The c path was not significant, although it approached significance; self-reported negative emotional empathy, b=-6.93, t(57)=1.79, p=.08, was not significantly associated with ASD traits, F(1, 57)=3.19, p=.08, R2=.04. Furthermore,
the a path was not significant, as self-reported negative emotional empathy, b=-1.66, t(57)=-.76, p=.45,
was not associated with inhibitory control, , F(1, 57)=.58, p=.45, R2=.009. The b path also was not significant, as inhibition, b=-.28, t(57)=-.92, p=.36, was not associated with ASD traits when controlling for selfreported negative emotional empathy, F(1, 57)=1.74, p=.19, R2=.05. The direct effect of self-reported
negative emotional empathy on ASD traits (path c’) approached but did not achieve significance, b=7.41, t(57)=-1.82, p=.07. Similarly, the indirect effect of inhibitory control was not significant, b=.47, 95%
CI [-.93, 3.27]. Overall, inhibitory control did not mediate the relationship between self-reported negative emotional empathy and ASD traits, and no relationships within the model were significantly associated.
3.6.2

Observed negative emotional empathy as X
Inhibitory control was examined as a potential mediator of the relationship between directly ob-

served negative emotional empathy and ASD traits (see Table 10 and Figure 7). The c path was not sig-
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nificant, as observed negative emotional empathy, b=.90, t(57)=.78, p=.44, was not significantly associated with ASD traits, F(1, 57)=.60, p=.44, R2=.009. However, the a path was significant, F(1, 57)=4.25,
p=.04, R2=.10. Specifically, for every one-unit increase in observed negative emotional empathy, inhibitory control decreased 1.45 units, b=-1.45, t(57)=-2.06, p=.04. In contrast, the b path was not significant,
as inhibitory control, b=-.20, t(57)=-.61, p=.55, was not associated with ASD traits when controlling for
observed negative emotional empathy, F(1, 57)=.49, p=.62, R2=.02. The direct effect of observed negative emotional empathy on ASD traits (path c’) was not significant, b=.61, t(57)=.47, p=.64. Similarly, the
indirect effect of inhibitory control was not significant, b=.29, 95% CI [-.67, 1.24]. Overall, inhibitory control did not mediate the relationship between observed negative emotional empathy and ASD traits.
However, observed negative emotional empathy was negatively associated with inhibitory control.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for IQ, executive functioning, empathy, and ASD measures
Measure
WASI-II FSIQ (2-subtest)
WAIS-IV Digit Span Forward (Attention)
WAIS-IV Digit Span Backward (Working Memory)
D-KEFS Verbal Fluency: Switching (Flexibility)
D-KEFS Color-Word Interference: Inhibition (Inhibition)
D-KEFS Tower: Achievement Score (Planning)
ACS Social Perception
Video Task Observation
Positive Clips
Negative Clips
Video Task Self-Report
Positive Items
Negative Items
AQ Total Score
Positive Empathy Scale

M(SD)
107.36 (11.27)
9.20 (2.31)
9.95 (2.47)
11.25 (2.70)
10.83 (2.51)
10.20 (2.49)
10.92 (2.54)

Range
89-132
4-14
4-16
5-18
5-15
5-19
6-17

1.95 (0.58)
1.62 (0.55)

1-3.33
1-3.50

2.72 (.61)
1.17 (.14)
19.25 (5.23)
92.41 (11.77)

1.32-3.68
1.01-1.62
2-30
51-105

Note. FSIQ scores are presented as standard scores, EF and ACS scores are presented as scaled scores, and empathy and ASD trait scores are presented as raw scores. Possible scores on observational and self-reported emotional empathy measures range from 1 to 4. Possible scores for AQ
range from 0 to 50, with 32 denoting clinically significant symptoms. Possible scores on the Positive Empathy Scale range from 15 to 105.
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Table 4. Correlation matrix for variables of interest

1- Age
2- Education
3- WASI-II FSIQ
4- DSF
5- DSB
6- VF Switching
7- CWIT Inhibition
8- Tower
Achievement
9- Video Obs
Positive Clips
10- Video Obs
Negative Clips
11- Video SR:
Positive Items
12- Video SR:
Negative Items
13- ACS
14- AQ
15- PES

1
1
.87**
-.07
-.11
.04
-.27
.03
-.07

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1
.05
-.04
.10
-.25
.07
-.07

1
.36**
.49**
.11
.53**
.42**

1
.54**
.06
.32*
.11

1
.02
.32*
.27*

1
.26
.30*

1
.40**

1

-.28*

-.20

-.03

-.10

-.10

-.16

-.24

-.10

1

-.15

-.09

-.11

-.09

-.06

-.01

-.22

-.08

.58**

1

.55

-.02

-.29*

-.13

-.29*

-.14

-.44**

-.31*

.35**

.13

1

.46

.11

.02

-.10

-.03

-.03

-.11

-.29*

.40**

.41**

.44**

1

-.03
.15
-.09

.07
.13
-.07

.21
-.09
.003

.12
-.001
-.03

.12
-.02
-.06

-.07
.14
-.11

.01
-.07
-.06

.34**
-.07
.06

.11
-.17
.33*

.13
.13
.20

-.05
-.23
.34**

-.10
-.16
.20

13

14

15

1
.01
.08

1
-.43**

1

Note. *p<.05, **p<.01. Spearman correlation coefficients are presented. DSF=Digit Span Backward; DSF=Digit Span Forward; VF=Verbal Fluency;
CWIT=Color-Word Interference Test; Obs=Observed emotional empathy; SR=Self-reported emotional empathy; ACS=Advanced Clinical Solutions
Social Perception Score; AQ=Autism Spectrum Quotient; PES=Positive Empathy Scale.
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Table 5. Results of mediation model for Hypothesis 1: Relationships among cognitive empathy, working memory, flexibility, and ASD traits
Steps of Mediation Model
Path c
Predictor: Cognitive Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path a
Predictor: Cognitive Empathy
Outcome: Working Memory
Outcome: Cognitive Flexibility
Path b
Predictor: Working Memory
Predictor: Cognitive Flexibility
Covariate: Cognitive Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path c’
Predictor: Cognitive Empathy
Mediator: Working Memory (Indirect Effect)
Mediator: Cognitive Flexibility (Indirect Effect)
Outcome: ASD Traits

R2
.001

Β (SE)

t

p

95% CI

.07 (.27)

.25

.80

[-.48, .61]

.08 (.13)
-.04 (.14)

.64
-.26

.52
.79

[-.17, .34]
[-.32, .25]

-.03 (.28)
.29 (.26)
.08 (.28)

-.10
1.14
.29

.92
.26
.77

[-.47, .63]
[-.22, .81]
[-.47, .63]

.08 (.28)
-.002 (.03)
-.01 (.07)

.29

.77

[-.47, .63]
[-.09, .06]
[-.14, .16]

.01

.16
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Table 6. Results of mediation model for Hypothesis 1: Relationships among cognitive empathy, working memory, flexibility, and ASD traits, controlling for administration order
Steps of Mediation Model
Path c
Predictor: Cognitive Empathy
Covariate: Administration Order
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path a
Predictor: Cognitive Empathy
Covariate: Administration Order
Outcome: Working Memory
Covariate: Administration Order
Outcome: Cognitive Flexibility
Path b
Predictor: Working Memory
Predictor: Cognitive Flexibility
Covariate: Cognitive Empathy
Covariate: Administration Order
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path c’
Predictor: Cognitive Empathy
Mediator: Working Memory (Indirect Effect)
Mediator: Cognitive Flexibility (Indirect Effect)
Outcome: ASD Traits

2

R
.01

Β (SE)

t

p

95% CI

.06 (.27)
.42 (.62)

.21
.21

.83
.50

[-.49, .61]
[-.82, 1.67]

-.10 (.29)
.08 (.13)
-.56 (.31)
-.02 (.14)

-.34
.65
-1.78
-.18

.73
.52
.08
.86

[-.69, .49]
[-.17, .34]
[-1.19, .07]
[-.30, .25]

-.02 (.28)
.35 (.27)
.07 (.28)
.62 (.64)

-.06
1.33
.25
.96

.95
.19
.80
.34

[-.49, .62]
[-.18, .89]
[-.49, .62]
[-.67, 1.90]

.07 (.28)
-.002 (.03)
-.01 (.07)

.25

.80

[-.49, .62]
[-.09, .06]
[-.15, .17]

.01

.04
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Table 7. Results of mediation model for Hypothesis 2A: Relationships among self-reported positive emotional empathy, attention, and ASD traits
Steps of Mediation Model
Path c
Predictor: Positive Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path a
Predictor: Positive Emotional Empathy
Outcome: Attention
Path b
Predictor: Attention
Covariate: Positive Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path c’
Predictor: Positive Emotional Empathy
Mediator: Attention (Indirect Effect)
Outcome: ASD Traits

R2
.08

Β (SE)

t

p

95% CI

-2.40 (1.10)

-2.19*

.03

[-4.59, -.20]

-.45 (.50)

-.90

.37

[-1.45, .55]

.05 (.29)
-2.38 (1.11)

.15
-2.14*

.88
.04

[-.54, .63]
[-4.60, -.15]

-2.38 (1.11)
-.02 (.18)

-2.14*

.04

[-4.60, -.15]
[-.44, .32]

.01

.08

Table 8. Results of mediation model for Hypothesis 2A: Relationships among observed positive emotional empathy, attention, and ASD traits
Steps of Mediation Model
Path c
Predictor: Positive Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path a
Predictor: Positive Emotional Empathy
Outcome: Attention
Path b
Predictor: Attention
Covariate: Positive Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path c’
Predictor: Positive Emotional Empathy
Mediator: Attention (Indirect Effect)
Outcome: ASD Traits

R2
.02

Β (SE)

t

p

95% CI

-1.33 (1.19)

-1.12

.27

[-3.72, 1.05]

-.07 (.53)

-.12

.90

[-1.13, 1.00]

.11 (.30)
-1.33 (1.20)

.38
-1.10

.70
.27

[-.48, .71]
[-3.73, 1.08]

-1.33 (1.20)
-.01 (.18)

-1.10

.27

[-3.73, 1.08]
[-.39, .40]

.0003

.02
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Table 9. Results of mediation model for Hypothesis 2B: Relationships among self-reported negative emotional empathy, inhibitory control, and
ASD traits
Steps of Mediation Model
Path c
Predictor: Negative Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path a
Predictor: Negative Emotional Empathy
Outcome: Inhibitory Control
Path b
Predictor: Inhibitory Control
Covariate: Negative Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path c’
Predictor: Negative Emotional Empathy
Mediator: Inhibitory Control (Indirect Effect)
Outcome: ASD Traits

R2
.04

Β (SE)

t

p

95% CI

-6.93 (3.88)

-1.79

.08

[-14.71, .84]]

-1.66 (2.18)

-.76

.45

[-6.04, 2.71]

-.28 (.31)
-7.41 (4.06)

-.92
-1.82

.36
.07

[-.90, .33]
[-15.54, .73]

-7.41 (4.06)
.47 (1.04)

-1.82

.07

[-15.54, .73]
[-.93, 3.27]

.009

.05

Note. Model uses Davidson-MacKinnon method to account for heteroscedasticity.
Table 10. Results of mediation model for Hypothesis 2B: Relationships among observed negative emotional empathy, inhibitory control, and ASD
traits
Steps of Mediation Model
Path c
Predictor: Negative Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path a
Predictor: Negative Emotional Empathy
Outcome: Inhibitory Control
Path b
Predictor: Inhibitory Control
Covariate: Negative Emotional Empathy
Outcome: ASD Traits
Path c’
Predictor: Negative Emotional Empathy (Direct Effect)
Mediator: Inhibitory Control (Indirect Effect)
Outcome: ASD Traits

R2
.01

Β (SE)

t

p

95% CI

.90 (1.16)

.78

.44

[-1.43, 3.23]

-1.45 (.70)

-2.06*

.04

[-2.87, -.04]

-.20 (.33)
.61 (1.30)

-.60
.47

.55
.64

[-.87, .47]
[-2.01, 3.22]

.61 (1.30)
.29 (.46)

.47

.64

[-2.01, 3.22]
[-.67, 1.24]

.10*

.02

Note. Model uses Davidson-MacKinnon method to account for heteroscedasticity.
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Figure 5. Results of Hypothesis 1
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Figure 6. Results for Hypothesis 2A
Note. Top model shows results for self-reported empathy, and bottom model shows results for observed empathy.
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Figure 7. Results for Hypothesis 2B
Note. Top model shows results for self-reported empathy, and bottom model shows results for observed empathy.
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4

DISCUSSION

The current study sought to clarify the relationships among empathy, EF, and ASD traits, and to
test the assertion that EF explains the relationship between empathy and ASD traits in a NT sample of
adults. Given the notion that ASD traits are present in the general population to varying degrees (Constantino, 2011), are normally distributed even in those without ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001), and may be continuously associated with other cognitive variables, it is helpful to consider the relationships among these various domains in individuals without ASD.
Mediation by EF was not supported across empathy domains; potential explanations for this lack
of mediation are discussed below. However, some notable findings emerged in the relationships among
individual domains, particularly between positive emotional empathy and ASD traits.
4.1

Eliciting positive emotional empathy
The method of this study successfully elicited both self-reported and observed positive empathy

in individuals observing positive events, in contrast with previous studies (Morelli et al., 2015). In particular, studies that involve observation of adults’ positive empathic responses tend to involve the participant in manipulations, such as having the participant self-disclose feelings to their partners (Gable et al.,
2006; Maisel, Gable, & Strachman, 2008). However, the personal nature of this exercise is likely to impact an individual’s personal affect regarding themselves, rather than mainly to elicit an empathic response to an outsider’s experience. Also, it is difficult to administer this type of task reliably, as participants are driving the interactions and are likely to do so in variable ways. Other studies that measure
positive empathy depend on self-report measures of empathy in individuals’ daily lives, rather than on
elicited empathy (Morelli et al., 2015). Therefore, it is meaningful that positive empathy was elicited
successfully in the current study for individuals uninvolved in the situation.
Success in eliciting positive emotional empathy in the current study supports the use of this paradigm in additional studies of positive empathy. Not only did it successfully result in observed positive
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empathy for uninvolved observers of the video clips, but the observed intensity of emotional empathy
correlated with self-reported emotional empathy both during the task and on a measure of positive empathy in daily life. Therefore, the task provides a method of eliciting positive emotional empathy that is
easy to reliably administer and that can simply be viewed by participants.
4.2

Hypothesis 1: Relationships among cognitive empathy, executive functioning, and ASD traits
The first hypothesis considered the role of working memory and cognitive flexibility as media-

tors of the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits in NT adults. None of the paths of the
proposed model were significant, and neither executive functioning variable mediated the relationship
between cognitive empathy and ASD traits as hypothesized.
There are a few potential explanations for the lack of a relationship between cognitive empathy
and ASD traits in the current study. The first possible explanation is that the majority of studies identifying impaired cognitive empathy in relation to ASD involve a comparison between an ASD group and a
non-ASD group (Castelli et al., 2002; Dziobek et al., 2008; Kleinman et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 2007), although a few have found a relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits on a continuum (Golan et al., 2007; Rot & Hogenelst, 2014). Therefore, it is possible that comparison of those with high ASD
traits (i.e., an ASD group) to those with low ASD traits (i.e., a non-ASD group) would yield a difference in
cognitive empathy using the methods of the current study. However, current views on ASD suggest that
symptoms lie on a continuous spectrum, and that a categorical cutoff is less appropriate (Constantino,
2011). This theory would imply that even in the current sample, in which participants have low levels of
ASD traits, an association with cognitive empathy should be detectible. Consistent with this theory, one
group (Gökçen et al., 2016, 2014) found an inverse relationship between ASD traits and ToM in a nonASD adult sample. However, this finding has not been supported by additional studies. Therefore, additional explanations for the lack of this relationship in the current study are considered.
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The majority of the literature establishing a relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD
traits focuses on children. It is possible that cognitive empathy is more impaired in individuals with ASD
in childhood than in adulthood. Specifically, individuals gain more experiences with social interactions as
they age, which may contribute to reduced cognitive empathy deficits as they age. Therefore, it is possible that the relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits diminishes into adulthood. There is
some evidence that empathic deficits decrease with age in individuals with ASD (McGovern & Sigman,
2005; Scheeren, Koot, Mundy, Mous, & Begeer, 2013), and that adolescents with ASD with intact IQ
show intact cognitive empathy (Downs & Smith, 2004). Although longitudinal studies thus far have focused on progression through childhood, rather than from childhood into adulthood, it is possible that
this pattern continues into adulthood.
In addition to the lack of a relationship between cognitive empathy and ASD traits, cognitive
empathy was not associated with working memory or cognitive flexibility. This relationship had been
hypothesized based on findings of similar associations in adults in previous studies (Lin et al., 2010), impairments in both these EF domains and cognitive empathy without direct comparison in previous studies (Holdnack et al., 2011; Ozonoff et al., 1991), and the theory that these executive skills are important
to cognitive empathy (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Senju, 2012). However, due to limited research in this
area, only a few studies have directly found cognitive empathy to be related to working memory (Lin et
al., 2010) and to cognitive flexibility (Gökçen et al., 2016). Therefore, it is possible that these particular
executive skills are individually less important to cognitive empathy in adults than previously believed.
However, performance on the Tower Test, a measure of planning that incorporates multiple executive skills including attention, working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility, was positively correlated with cognitive empathy. This finding was reported in another study involving a sample
of NT adults (Gökçen et al., 2016). Successful performance on this task may suggest that the sum of
these executive parts is greater than each individual executive subdomain in isolation, and at least in
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adults, this synergistic role of various executive subcomponents may be what is associated with cognitive empathy.
This finding could help to explain why literature on cognitive empathy in individuals with ASD
does not always identify impairments. It is possible that recognition of another person’s empathic state
is not the core impairment, but ability to generate, organize, and plan an appropriate response to their
emotional state is the core impairment. This finding is consistent with Frye’s (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai,
1995) theory that ToM depends on ability to reason based on rules and ability to plan deliberate action.
However, this relationship should be explored in future studies as mediation was not supported in the
current study.
4.3

Hypothesis 2A: Relationships among positive emotional empathy, attention, and ASD traits
Attentional ability was examined as a mediator of the relationship between positive emotional

empathy and ASD traits. In this model, attention did not partially mediate the relationship when considering either self-reported or observed positive emotional empathy. Although research on the relationship between positive emotional empathy and EF has been very limited, prior studies have found that
positive affect tends to enhance attentional skills, suggesting that these abilities may be interrelated
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Goschke & Bolte, 2014). However, a measure of basic attention was used
in the current study, in contrast to more complex attentional skills examined in the previous studies. For
example, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) considered the influence of positive affect on a measure of
attention to global versus local details, with the suggestion that positive affect would broaden attention
to focus on global details. It is possible that a task such as this, or one involving more complex aspects of
attention such as divided attention, would have been associated with positive empathy in the current
study. In particular, perhaps a minimal level of basic attention is required to be available to be affected
by positive empathy, but once this minimal level of basic attention is achieved, it is no longer associated
with empathy.
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Although the relationship was not mediated by attention, self-reported positive emotional empathy predicted ASD traits, such that higher levels of empathy were associated with lower levels of ASD
traits. In addition to these findings on a behavioral task, higher levels of self-reported positive emotional
empathy in one’s daily life was moderately correlated with lower levels of ASD traits. This is a novel finding, likely because the majority of previous studies did not examine positive and negative emotional
empathy separately when considering a relationship with ASD traits, and only about half of them found
emotional empathy to be impaired in an ASD group (see Table 1). It is possible that these studies did not
find differences between the ASD and non-ASD groups because they combined positive and negative
empathy, which are likely to be experienced differently (see Section 1.3.2).
Those studies that did find a difference in emotional empathy between adults with and without
ASD did not examine the continuous relationship between ASD traits and empathy (Mathersul et al.,
2013; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2014), although group comparisons would suggest that higher ASD traits
(i.e., an ASD group) may correspond to lower empathy scores. In contrast, Mazza and colleagues (2014)
found that a small sample of adolescents with ASD did not demonstrate impaired positive empathy in
response to static images of individuals looking happy. Results in the current study are thought to better
reflect positive emotional empathy due to the more naturalistic and engaging nature of the video clips
compared to static images.
This inverse association is consistent with the theoretical role for positive emotional empathy
involvement in ASD symptomatology. The AQ is based on DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria for autistic disorder, involving the classic triad of social, communication, and restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped interests and behaviors (RRB; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Some symptoms seem as though they would be
impacted by positive empathy in particular. For example, one of the social symptoms is “A lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with other people” (APA, 1994). This
symptom speaks specifically to limited positive engagement with others, an impairment of which could
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be driven by impaired positive empathy. Furthermore, impaired ability to sustain conversations and
continuous engagement in RRB may be impacted by positive empathy. If individuals experience a reduced ability to feel another person’s positive emotions, they are less likely to be reinforced by another
person’s positive emotions and thus less likely to engage in conversations that interest the other person
or do activities related to another person’s interests.
4.4

Hypothesis 2B: Relationships among negative emotional empathy, inhibitory control, and ASD
traits
Inhibitory control was not a significant mediator of the relationship between negative emotional

empathy and ASD traits. As discussed above, this negative finding may relate to the empathy stimuli,
which provide more opportunities to elicit positive empathy than negative empathy. This could explain
why previous findings indicating that inhibition mediates the relationship between empathy and interpersonal functioning (Iacono et al., 2015) are inconsistent with the current study. Furthermore, the empathy variable used in the mentioned study was a self-report measure of general empathy (EQ), rather
than empathic responses to negative stimuli as in the current study. The outcome variable was also interpersonal functioning, which while related to ASD traits is not identical to ASD traits. Therefore, differences in methods between the current and the previous study may help to explain the difference in
findings.
However, it is most likely that inhibitory control was not a mediator in the current study because
negative emotional empathy was not associated with ASD traits to begin with. As discussed above (see
4.3.1), negative emotional empathy was not associated with ASD traits, whereas positive empathy was
associated with ASD traits. Two studies (Dziobek et al., 2008; Rogers et al., 2007) found (primarily negative) emotional empathy scores to be similar for adult groups with and without ASD. Authors indicated
that this was consistent with anecdotal reports that individuals with ASD often do demonstrate caring
for distressed individuals, and that perhaps individuals with ASD have been considered to have impaired
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empathy because their responses to emotion are different than expected due to flattened affect and
social anxiety. Therefore, it is possible that negative emotional empathy may not be associated with ASD
traits, although this requires further investigation.
Nevertheless, higher observed negative emotional empathy was associated with lower levels of
inhibitory control, which was in the opposite direction than hypothesized. It had been proposed that
reduced negative empathy would be associated with reduced ability to inhibit one’s own negative experience in response to another person’s experience (i.e., resulting in greater personal distress). The current findings highlight a potential alternative relationship; such that reduced inhibitory control may relate to greater ease of comprehension and felt experience of someone else’s emotional state (i.e., more
akin to emotional contagion). In other words, one with reduced inhibitory control may be more prone to
being impacted by and producing automatic responses to negative stimuli than one who is better able to
inhibit these automatic responses. This finding is consistent with Iacono and colleagues’ (2015) suggestion that reduced inhibitory control may relate to reduced ability to suppress responses to emotional
stimuli in one’s environment.
4.5

Self-reported versus directly observed emotional empathy
It is notable that self-reported and observed emotional empathy were not strongly correlated.

In the current study, participants were made aware that their faces were being recorded while they
watched videos and that these recordings were going to later be coded by an examiner. It is possible
that knowledge of their being observed influenced their emotional expression. A well-established theory
of social psychology, the evaluation apprehension theory (Cottrell, 1972), suggests that individuals may
perform differently on tasks when they feel that another person is evaluating them. Similarly, one may
behave in a way that they believe to be socially desirable (Koritzky & Yechiam, 2010), which in this case
would be to emote either more or less than one typically would in response to emotional content. As
discussed above, individuals with high levels of inhibitory control may be better able to inhibit responses
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to emotional stimuli. Indeed, Ekman (1993) has suggested that individuals’ facial expressions do not always reflect their emotions. Taken together, it is possible that self-reported emotion provided a more
accurate reflection of how the individual was feeling in the current study.
4.6

Executive functions and ASD traits
Relationships between executive functions and ASD traits are discussed separately, as they ap-

ply to multiple models discussed above. In the current study, ASD traits were not significantly associated
with any EF domain assessed. The lack of a relationship between EF and ASD traits in this study has a
few possible explanations.
The current study used a sample that fell well below the ASD cutoff on the AQ. As mentioned
above, most studies concerning this topic compare EF skills in an ASD group to a NT group to indicate
impairments. It is possible that an association between these domains exists at impaired levels of EF.
Furthermore, the current sample was primarily an undergraduate student sample, which selects for educated, often high achieving, and typically intelligent participants, rather than a more generalizable
sample. Although there have been mixed findings regarding the relationship between intelligence and
EF (Friedman et al., 2006; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), successful engagement in higher education is likely to
be supported by strong EF skills such as attention, working memory, planning, and organization. Therefore, it is possible that the lack of an association between EF and ASD traits is driven by the sample having the combination of both strong EF skills and low levels of ASD traits.
Additionally, it is possible that a variable integrating the important components of various EF
domains, such as a latent class variable, would be associated with ASD traits, and that dividing EF up into
different domains reduced power for identifying associations. Finally, the measure of ASD traits used in
the current study was based on self-report. Although the AQ is well validated and widely used, it is possible that a behavioral measure of ASD would be more strongly associated with the behavioral EF
measures used in the current study.
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4.7

Summary
Although the mediations in the current study were not supported, positive emotional empathy

was inversely associated with ASD traits, whereas cognitive empathy was not associated with ASD traits,
in this sample of neurotypical adults with a restricted range of ASD traits that did not approach clinical
significance. This is a novel finding that suggests future efforts should focus on the potential importance
of positive emotional empathy in relation to ASD traits. Previous research has not examined the relationship between positive emotional empathy and ASD traits. However, findings from the current study
indicate that reduced ability to demonstrate an empathic response to others’ positive emotions is likely
to be associated with relatively higher levels of ASD traits, even in a neurotypical sample. This finding is
consistent with ASD symptoms that are likely to be associated with positive empathy specifically, such as
a lack of seeking to share enjoyment with others. Furthermore, cognitive empathy was positively associated with planning ability on a complex EF task, which suggests that the integration of multiple executive skills is likely important to successful cognitive empathy.
4.8

Limitations
The current study has several limitations that should be considered when interpreting findings.

Most notably, the sample used in the current study is an undergraduate population. As mentioned
above, this sample reduces generalizability of findings to the general population (Gallander Wintre,
North, & Sugar, 2001). Furthermore, the relatively small sample limited the opportunity for inclusion of
covariates and multiple mediator models.
Another limitation of the study is that the sample was made of up mostly females. Although
there were no significant differences between males and females on any tasks in the current study, the
sex ratio does not reflect that found in individuals on the autism spectrum. In particular, males are four
times more likely to be diagnosed with ASD than females (Baio et al., 2018). Furthermore, Baron-Cohen
(2011) has even suggested that ASD reflects overrepresentation of traditional male characteristics due
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to possible biological influences, and that this explains why ASD is more common in males. Although
Mandy and colleagues (2018) found that males had higher levels of ASD traits in childhood but that this
difference disappeared by adolescence, it is possible that the sample in the current study does not accurately reflect ASD traits found in the general population due to overrepresentation of females.
Furthermore, the stimuli used to elicit emotional empathy provided more numerous opportunities to evoke positive than negative empathy. This is because although the video clips used as the empathy measure include evidence of the devastating impact of a storm on a charitable woman’s home and
her life, they focus primarily on the positive impact of the remodeling of her home on her life and on
those she helps in the community. Although this is a strength of the study in terms of eliciting a robust
positive response in participants, this weakened the interpretability of negative empathy findings.
4.9

Future Directions
The current findings would benefit from replication with a larger sample that is not majority un-

dergraduate, and with use of a task that better measures negative emotional empathy. This replication
would lend support for greater research and clinical emphasis on positive than negative emotional empathy in relation to ASD traits. Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate the hypotheses from
the current study using a cognitive empathy measure that is less dependent on emotion recognition and
instead involves more strictly cognitive mental state attribution, such as the Faux Pas Test. Furthermore, the finding that planning is associated with cognitive empathy warrants further exploration. For
example, causal relationships between these variables should be examined in order to identify additional intervention targets for improving cognitive skills across ASD.
Overall, these findings highlight the importance of examining positive and negative emotional
empathy separately in future research of empathy in various populations, an occurrence which has been
very rare in previous studies. Findings also indicate that although the focus of ASD research has been
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primarily on cognitive empathy impairments, emotional empathy and particularly positive emotional
empathy is an important area for focus in future research of ASD.
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